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The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act
of 2009: Legislative Imprudence, Patent Devaluation,
and the False Start of a Multi-Billion Dollar Industry
Brian F McMahon'
INTRODUCTION
O N March 23, 2010, the final piece of the puzzle that presumably would
launch a new multi-billion dollar industry was placed. On that day,
President Obama signed into law the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act of 2009 ("BPCIA" or "the Act").' The purpose of the Act
was to create an abbreviated regulatory approval process through which
pharmaceutical companies could obtain FDA approval to market biologic
medicinal therapies substantially similar to other biologic therapies that
had already received FDA approval.3 Legislation of this kind had been
enacted some twenty-five years earlier with the passage of the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 ("the Hatch-
Waxman Act" or "Hatch-Waxman"), 4 but this' legislation was limited to
creating an efficient approval process only for generic synthetic drugs.
At the time, limiting such a process to synthetic drugs was of little
concern. Biologics comprised only a miniscule percentage of the overall
pharmaceutical market.
That has since changed. Within the last decade, biologics have played
an increasingly prominent role in medicine; the market for new biologic
medicines has grown at twice the rate as its synthetic drug counterpart.
i Mr. McMahon is a former law clerk to then-Chief Judge H. Robert Mayer of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and is a member of the law firm of Christensen
O'Connor Johnson Kindne.ss PLLC in Seattle, Washington. Mr. McMahon has dedicated his
practice to counseling and litigating on behalf of clients active within the pharmaceutical
industry , and he can be reached at brian.mcmahon@cojk.com. The contents and opinions pre-
sented herein are attributed solely to the individual author and not his past, present, or future
employers or clients. The author is indebted to Professors John R. Thomas, Joseph S. Miller,
and Samir D. Parikh, as well as to Stephanie Hsieh and Don W. Anthony, Ph.D., for their com-
mentary and guidance in forging this article.
2 Approval Pathway, for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biological Products; Public
Hearing; Request for Comments, 75 Fed. Reg. 192, 61,497 (Oct. 5, zoIo) [hereinafter Request
for Comments].
3 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 700(b), 124
Stat. 119, 804 (2010).
4 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 U.S.C. § 27I(e)
(2oo6).
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With no decline of this trend in sight, and with the ever-increasing cost of
medicinal therapies following the same trajectory, the need to establish an
abbreviated regulatory approval process for "biosimilars" had become too
pressing to ignore.
The resultant Act purportedly is designed to reward innovation while
reducing overall costs to consumers.5 These twin, seemingly contradictory
aims are the same as those that prompted enactment of the earlier,
ultimately successful Hatch-Waxman legislation.6 As such, the two Acts are
unsurprisingly similar in certain respects. In other respects, there is stark
contrast. Within both the similarities and differences, however, the BPCIA
contains numerous flaws that ultimately will stifle the growth of a nascent
biosimilar pharmaceutical industry, if not pharmaceutical innovation
altogether.
Despite their potential deleterious effect on pharmaceutical industries
and innovation, however, the flaws of the BPCIA serve a valuable purpose.
At the very least they serve to underscore the virtue of incorporating
"legislative prudence," a seemingly long-forgotten, originally Aristotelian
notion, into the modern lawmaking process. The BPCIA also provides
substantial guidance in formulating a process-oriented standard by which
one can evaluate the legislative prudence of a particular Act.
It was my original intent in first drafting this article merely to identify
for the reader the significant flaws of the BPCIA, some of which heretofore
remained unidentified, and to submit potential solutions for consideration.
As more flaws became apparent during scrutiny of the Act, however, a theme
emerged: In its haste to respond to increasing external pressures for an
abbreviated biosimilars regulatory approval pathway, Congress ratified this
legislation merely hoping it would work. It abandoned several common-
sense principles in an effort to timely respond to its constituencies. While
Congressional intent may have been true, the resultant Act is potentially
fatal to its intended purposes.
As such, this article is the result of an attempt to achieve two
objectives. First, I hope to provide the reader with a minimal but sufficient
understanding of pharmaceutical science, FDA regulatory approval
processes, patent law, and today's pharmaceutical industry in order to
facilitate appreciation of the subsequently identified flaws of the BPCIA
and corresponding proposed solutions. Second, I will use scrutiny of the
BPCIA to argue that ancient notions of legislative prudence, adapted for
modern use, would serve Congress well in all future legislative endeavors.
To accomplish these objectives, Part I will provide an overview of the
current domestic pharmaceutical industry, the role of legislation in that
industry, the import of incentives in pharmaceutical legislation, and an
5 § 7001(b), 124 Stat. at 8o4.
6 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e).
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overview of how Hatch-Waxman has influenced the industry. Part II will
explain the difference between synthetic drugs and biologic therapies,
and also explain why Congress could not simply modify Hatch-Waxman
to establish an abbreviated regulatory approval pathway for biologics. Part
III will summarize the current terms of the BPCIA and compare them to
corresponding provisions of Hatch-Waxman to illustrate how Congress is
attempting to accommodate the substantial differences between synthetic
drugs and biologics. Part IV will explicitly identify the most significant
shortcomings of the BPCIA and proffer solutions to those flaws. Finally,
Part V will explain how each shortcoming of the BPCIA is violative of
general notions of legislative prudence and will provide a modern, working
definition of the virtue. Further, Part V will attempt to set forth a non-
exhaustive list of characteristics, deduced from the BPCIAs most notable
missteps, that should comprise at least in part a modern version of the
Aristotelian virtue.
I. TODAY'S PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY & THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION
Today's domestic pharmaceutical industry is enormous by almost any
standard, and it is growing. In 2007, U.S. pharmaceutical sales amounted to
more than $285 billion.7 In the three years that followed, despite a widely-
felt economic downturn, sales of U.S. pharmaceuticals grew almost thirteen
percent to reach $307 billion.8 Further still, estimates currently project
annual pharmaceutical sales to reach almost $800 billion by 2015.9
In 2010, biologics comprised just over ten percent of the total new
products approved by the FDA.10 This marks an increase of over three
percent from the previous year," and an increase of over five percent
from 2008.Y2 While this trend-might seem marginally significant to some,
7 See About GPhA: Facts at a Glance, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASS'N, http://www.
gphaonline.org/about-gpha/about-generics/facts (last visited Aug. 14, 20I i).
8 See Hossam Abdel-Kader, Research and Markets: Pharmaceutical Industry in the United
States, PR INSIDE, http://www.pr-inside.com/research-and-markets-pharmaceutical-
industry-r2737897.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 201 i).
9 Bruce Carlson, Biologics Pipeline Set to Replenish Coffers, GENETIC ENGINEERING &
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, Aug. 20o, at 14, available at http://www.genengnews.com/gen-
articles/biologics-pipeline-set-to-replenish--coffers/3366/.
io See CDER Drug and Biologic Calendar Year Approvals as of December 31,
2010, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/UCM260585.pdf
(last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
II CDER Drug and Biologic Calendar Year Approvals as of December 31, 2009,
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
H owD ru gsare Developed and Ap proved/Drugand B iologicAp prova IRep orts/
PriorityNDAandBLAApprovals/UCMo9o 9 9 5 .pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
12 CDER Drug and Biologic Approvals for Calendar Year 2oo8 Updated through December
31, 2oo8, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
1 637
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the effect the growth of biologics has had on the overall pharmaceutical
industry is undeniably substantial. Due to the increased costs in research,
development, and manufacturing of biologic therapies, as will be further
explained herein, sales of biologics in 2010 comprised almost a quarter of
the total domestic pharmaceutical sales for the year measured in dollars. 3
With annual domestic sales of pharmaceuticals reaching stratospheric
levels, and with biologics becoming an increasingly significant share of
those sales, it is small wonder that the passage of the BPCIA has received
such tremendous attention.1
4
A. Legislative Impact on the Pharmaceutical Industty
The impact that any legislation-let alone the BPCIA---can have on the
pharmaceutical industry cannot be overstated. Indeed, since at least 1962
when passage of the "Kefauver Amendments" modified the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("the FDCA") to require proof of a drug's efficacy
as well as safety before marketing, the industry has owed its existence
to federal legislation.' Acts like the FDCA, The Orphan Drug Act of
1983 ("the ODA"), 16 Hatch-Waxman, and The Medicare Modernization
Act of 2003 ("the MMA"), 17 along with their corresponding regulations
enacted by the FDA under delegated authority, govern nearly all aspects
of the medicinal drug market. Laws like the Public Health Service Act
("PHSA"), s the ODA, and now the BPCIA, again with corresponding
regulations, govern medicinal biologics. To clearly illustrate the effect
legislation has on the pharmaceutical industry, consider the following
entirely fictitious hypothetical relating to the approval of a new drug under
current applicable law and regulation:
Pferck is a company with a long history of developing innovative
synthetic drugs to treat various disease states. It maintains an
impressive portfolio of patents, covering a variety of FDA-
approved drugs indicated for the treatment of various disease
HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/UCM200924.pdf
(last visited Jan. 7,2012).
13 See Katherine N. Addison, The Impact of the Biosimilars Provision of the Health Care Re-
form Bill on Innovation Investments, 1o J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 553, 554-55 (zo i).
14 See Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of2oog, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 67 I, 69 7- 9 8 (zoo); FDA, Public
Hearing on Approval Pathway for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biological Products Public
Meeting (Nov. 2-3, zoo) [hereinafter Hearings], available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
NewsEvents/ucm2Z 1688.htm.
15 Carver et al., supra note 14, at 672-78.
i6 Orphan Drug Act, z U.S.C. § 36occ(a) (zoo6).
17 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. io8-173, 177 Stat. 2o66.
18 Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58.Stat. 682 (1944).
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states. Its most recent project is related to the development
of a treatment for color blindness. After years of research and
development, Pferck believes the cure for color blindness can be
found in a synthetic drug of its own creation, plutoniox. Pferck
believes plutoniox is both safe and effective for the treatment of
color blindness, and it hopes to market its drug under the brand
name ColorView.
Before Pferck can market ColorView within the United States, it must
first obtain FDA approval to certify by government standards that ColorView
in fact demonstrates a statistically significant therapeutic effect in treating
colorblindness and that it is sufficiently safe for human consumption.1 9
To do this, Pferck must submit to the FDA what is commonly referred to
as a New Drug Application ("NDA"). 0 The submission of an NDA by a
sponsor such as Pferck is no small matter-one can certainly imagine the
wealth of information required by the government before the FDA would
approve a drug as safe and effective for human consumption. Indeed, an
exhaustive list of information required in any given NDA is provided in the
Code of Federal Regulations.2 ' Practically speaking, most NDAs contain
approximately 100,000 pages.22 Before a sponsor can begin compiling
this information, however, the sponsor must seek FDA permission on a
different front.
Unsurprisingly, an NDA almost always requires the inclusion of data
compiled from drug studies conducted in humans ("clinical trials").
2 3
Because drugs cannot be administered to humans even as part of a scientific
study without express consent from the FDA,14 however, the sponsor
must first submit an Investigational New Drug Application ("IND") to
conduct clinical trials. The information required for mere approval of an
IND, though less than that included as part of an NDA, is still substantial."
And approval of an IND means only that the applicant can conduct what
generally will be a very costly, and very lengthy, protocol in order to gather
information that may or may not ultimately support approval of the yet-
to-be-submitted NDA. If all goes well, a potential NDA applicant might
be ready to submit its NDA approximately six years and millions of dollars
following IND approval.
2 6
As is readily apparent from even this quick glimpse of the regulatory
approval process for a new drug, legislation affecting the pharmaceutical
19 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(i) (2006).
20 JOHN R. ThiOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 8 (2005).
21 2iC.FR. §314.50(2011).
22 New Drug Approval Process, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/fda-approval-process-
html (last visited Aug. 14,201 I) [hereinafter New Drug Approval Process].
23 21 C.ER. § 314.5o(d)(3).
24 21 C.FR. § 312.20 (2011).
25 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (201).
26 See New Drug Approval Process, supra note 22.
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industry has imposed tremendous costs on those seeking to market
pharmaceuticals. Laws like the FDCA, PHSA, and related acts therefore
can readily stifle the growth of the industry if not carefully balanced
with appropriate incentives. The additional costs incurred in developing
new pharmaceuticals due to legislative requirements must be offset by
appropriate legislative incentives in order to ensure and promote the
industry's future. Historically the U.S. Government has done well in this
regard. For instance, a 2010 study recently revealed that only thirteen
percent of potential synthetic drugs survive the scrutiny imposed by
government-required IND trials.2 7 Of those that pass IND muster to
become the subject of an NDA, less than three-quarters will receive
FDA approval for commercial marketing. 8 Despite these long odds
for commercialization of new products, however, the number of NDAs
submitted each year continues to grow. As of July 8, 2011, the FDA had
approved almost as many new drugs in 2011 as it had in all of 2010.9 The
rationale to pursue NDAs in the face of probable failure can be found in
the incentives awaiting NDA applicants should they succeed-guaranteed
market exclusivity.
B. The Need for Incentives in Pharmaceutical Legislation
Market exclusivity, in its most general sense, is the period of time during
which a sponsor's product is the only drug product FDA-approved and
commercially available to treat any particular condition or disease state. For
example, reverting to the aforementioned hypothetical briefly, the market
exclusivity for ColorView (plutoniox) is the period of time beginning from
when ColorView (plutoniox) is first approved by the FDA for commercial
marketing and ending when a competing product similar to ColorView
(e.g., a "generic" plutoniox) is commercially launched. The longer the
market exclusivity of a particular FDA-approved product, the longer the
drug sponsor can charge a premium for its drug product without fear of
competition. This benefit is crucial to innovative drug companies, as it is
the primary mechanism by which it may recoup costs for its other failed
drug products.3" Also, the longer the time to charge a premium, the lower
27 See JA DiMasi et al., Trends in Risks Associated with New Drug Development: Success Rates
for Investigational Drugs, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &THERAPUTICS 272, 272, 276-77 (2010).
28 FDA Is Rejecting More New Drugs than in Past, MSNBC (Aug. 17, 207,4:i6 PM), http:HI
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/zo3z 1830/.
29 FDA's Drug Approval Rate for 2011 on Pace to Exceed zoo, Fox NEWS (July 8, 2o11),
http://www.foxnews.com/health/2o 11 /07/O8/fdas-drug-approval-rate-for-2o Il-on-pace-to-
exceed-2olo/.
30 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 47 (2OO6), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/1O-02-DrugR-D.
pdf.
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the premium needs to be. Protracted market exclusivity therefore can be
instrumental in lowering the initial costs of new drugs.
Market exclusivities can take many forms. Before explaining the various
types of market exclusivities, however, certain definitions are in order.
The term "market exclusivity" has meant many things to many authors,
depending on the context of their works. For instance, market exclusivity
has been used to mean a right vested through regulation that prohibits
others from market entry, distinguishing the term from that of "data
exclusivity."3' The term has also been used more loosely to encompass
all forms of regulatory exclusivity.3 With various understandings of the
term in circulation, continued discussion of exclusivities requires a more
rigidly defined lexicon. As such, the term "market exclusivity" will be used
herein, but only with modifiers properly attributable to the distinguished
philosopher John Rawls. 3
1. Pure Market Exclusivity Defined.-Pure market exclusivity is the right
afforded a market participant to be the single provider of a particular good
or service within a specific market for a time certain. The right may be
vested by way of ownership of one or more enforceable patents, by way
of possessing a singular exclusive license of any relevant patents, by
way of a regulatory grant of exclusivity, or by any other means. Within
pharmaceutical legislation, to the extent it can be achieved, pure market
exclusivity generally comes in two forms' patent exclusivity and regulatory
exclusivity.3"
2. Patent Exclusivity vs. Regulatory Exclusivity.-
(a) Patent Exclusivity
Patent exclusivity is derived from the Patent Act of 1952,36 which in part
provides that the holder of a patent shall have "the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling" the invention claimed by
31 See Maxwell R. Morgan, Regulation of Innovation Under Follow-On Biologics Legisla-
tion: FDA Exclusivity as an Efficient Incentive Mechanism, I I COLUM. ScI. & TECH. L. REV. 93, 98
(2010); see also Addison, supra note 13, at 567 (citing Morgan, supra, at ioo).
32 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Rok of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELE-
COMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 365 (2007).
33 JOHN RAWLS, ATHEORY OF JUSTICE 73-77 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1971).
34 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1 ) (2oo6) (extending patent protection to new drug applica-
tions under certain conditions).
35 See, e.g., § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii) (extending a five year regulatory exclusivity pe-
riod for new chemical entities); § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii), (j)(5)(F)(iii) (extending a three year regula-
tory exclusivity period for new clinical studies conducted on drug products).
36 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792.
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the patent.37 Those in the pharmaceutical industry typically have regarded
this right as an extremely valuable one, particularly when the right is
combined with the required pre-market approval process at the FDA. For
reasons that will be discussed in greater detail below, patent rights in the
pharmaceutical context can be an effective deterrent to others hoping to
compete in a profitable market space.
The standards for obtaining a patent are well promulgated, and a
patentee "shall be entitled to a patent unless" certain conditions of non-
patentability are found.3 8 Among those conditions are lack of novelty,3 9
obviousness, 40 and perhaps most relevant for purposes of this discussion,
lack of enablement.41 Specifically, the enablement requirement of the
Patent Act requires a patentee to disclose sufficient information about the
invention in the patent itself such that one of ordinary skill in the relevant
art, after reading the disclosures made in the patent, could practice or make
the invention without unnecessary experimentation. 41 In exchange for the
disclosure explaining how to make or practice the invention, the patentee
is entitled to the aforementioned right to exclude for a period of twenty
years. 43 The twenty-year period begins on the day the earliest related
patent application is filed.44 Upon expiration of the patent's term, the
public is then free to practice or make or even improve upon the previously
patented invention, and the Constitutional objective of the Patent Act to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" is therefore achieved. 45
The statutory term of a patent's right to exclude has been deemed the
"'quid pro quo' for the full disclosure of the invention to the public,' but
pharmaceutical patent holders could never reap the benefit of a patent's
37 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(i) (2oo6).
38 35 U.S.C. § 102 (zoo6).
39 Id.
40 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2oo6).
41. 3 5 U.S.C. § 112 (2oo6).
42 N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F2d 93 1, 941 (Fed. Cir. 199o).
43 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002);
seealso J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,484 (1974)).
44 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). The Patent Act of 1952 originally awarded a patent term
of seventeen years from the date the patent issued. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593,
66 Stat. 792, 804. As a result of a Patent Cooperation Treaty entered into as part of the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade agreements, however, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act was
enacted in an effort to harmonize domestic patent laws with corresponding international laws.
Thereafter, patents issuing from applications submitted after June 8, 1995, receive a twenty
year term measured from the date the earliest patent application is filed. Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, io8 Stat. 4809 (1994).
45 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46 J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 142.
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full statutory term-at least not prior to enactment of Hatch-Waxman.47
Because pharmaceutical products require regulatory approval before
commercial use, and because NDA approvals commonly issued well after
a relevant patent's statutory term. had begun, NDA applicants were forced
to launch their innovative patented pharmaceutical products commercially
often with less than half of the original patent term remaining. 48 Through no
fault of the NDA applicants, the regulatory approval process was nullifying
a significant portion of their patents. 49 The truncated duration of their
right to exclude would in turn drive initial costs of newly commercialized
drugs higher than they would have been otherwise. The NDA holders
were forced to charge more for their product because they had less time to
recoup their costs before generic competitors would reach the market. The
net effect was that the public suffered. The "Patent Term Restoration"
portion of the Hatch-Waxman Act remedied this defect by affording NDA
holders the opportunity to extend the life of one affected patent for up to
five years, depending on the period of exclusivity lost due to the regulatory
approval process.50
The portion of the Hatch-Waxman Act dedicated to establishing an
abbreviated approval process for generic drugs also affects the significance
of patent exclusivities in the development of new synthetic drugs. For
example, rare is the case where a sponsor submits an NDA for a drug
product that is not covered by the scope of at least one issued U.S. patent
either owned or exclusively licensed by the sponsor. To ensure that the
FDA is aware of any relevant patents pertaining to the drug product, and
to prevent the FDA from inadvertently approving for commercial launch
a generic drug product arguably within the scope of one of these patents,
the terms of the Hatch-Waxman Act require a sponsor to file with its NDA
"the patent number and the expiration date of any patent which claims
the drug" product or "a method of using such drug" that is the subject of
the NDA.5 1 The Hatch-Waxman Act also requires the sponsor to timely
supplement this information should any relevant patent issue after the
NDA is filed but before it is approved.5 1 Upon approval of the NDA, the
FDA publishes this patent information in its Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly referred to as the "Orange
Book." 3 By virtue of this publication, the FDA shifts the burden to any
47 Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration, 66 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 526, 527 (1984).
48 Id.
49 Id.
5o See 35 U.S.C.A. § 156 (West Supp. 2011); see also Alfred B. Engelberg et al., Balancing
Innovation, Access, and Profits - Market Exclusivity for Biologics, 361 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1917
(2009).
51 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006).
52 Id.
53 Id.; see THOMAS, supra nOte 2o, at 327; see also FDA, ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG
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applicant wishing to'obtain approval of a generic version of the new drug
product to represent that commercialization of the generic version of the
drug product will not impinge on the patent rights of the new drug sponsor.
This will be addressed in more detail in Part III, infra.
(b) Regulatory Exclusivity
Regulatory exclusivity, at least for purposes of this article, is somewhat
of a misnomer. In the context of pharmaceutical legislation regulatory
exclusivity is actually a statutory edict prohibiting either potential
market competitors from filing an application seeking FDA approval to
compete, or the FDA from approving an application of a potential market
competitor in certain circumstances. Also, depending on the type of
regulatory exclusivity at issue, the prohibition may nevertheless permit
more than one market participant at a given time. Others have referred to
the different types of regulatory exclusivities as either "data exclusivity" or
"market exclusivity.' ' 4 Herein, three types of regulatory exclusivities will
be discussed: "data exclusivity," "procedurally perfect market exclusivity,"
and "procedurally imperfect market exclusivity." The distinctions will
prove useful in discussing the various incentives within both Hatch-
Waxman and the BPCIA, infra.
(i) Data Exclusivity
Data exclusivity has already been well-defined, and its definition is
appropriate for use herein. It is a type of regulatory exclusivity that prevents
any later-filing FDA applicant from relying on clinical data submitted by a
first applicant in order to obtain FDA approval."5 More simply, it prevents
"piggy-backing." Data exclusivity therefore does not necessarily prevent
potential market competitors from entering a given market. Rather, it
renders entry to the market to be nearly as costly for later entrants as it
was for the first. If a later-filing FDA applicant is willing to bear the cost
of conducting its own clinical trials, for example, data exclusivity will not
prohibit that applicant from submitting its product to the FDA for review,
and it will not bar the FDA from approving that application. The award
of data exclusivity therefore is not as valuable to a first applicant as other
types of regulatory exclusivity, in part because it is generally conferred for a
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EOUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (2001), available at http://www.
accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfrm.
54 See Addison, supra note 13, at 567; see also Steven Lendaris, Fine-Tuning the Generic
Biologic Approval Process, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 14, 2011, available at http://www.bakerbotts.com/
file-upload/documents/LendarisNLJarticleMarch21o i .pdf.
55 See Morgan, supra note 31, at 98.
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relatively short period of time. In practice, however, data exclusivity is still
an effective deterrent for later-filers.
In the context of Hatch-Waxman, data exclusivity is awarded in certain
circumstances for periods of three, four, or five years.-6 As found in the
BPCIA, such exclusivity is awarded for four.5 By conferring data exclusivity
for so brief a time, the value of data exclusivity can nearly equal that of
pure market exclusivity. So long as the cost to a later filer for conducting
its own clinical trials is greater than the profits it might realize during the
period of data exclusivity, a later-filer would be fiscally foolish to seek
FDA approval prior to the expiration of the data exclusivity period. Note
also that cost is measured both in terms of dollars and time. Therefore, a
later-filer's pursuit of FDA approval during a data exclusivity period makes
sound business sense only in the rarest of cases: where clinical data could
be gathered and submitted in sufficient time such that it could recoup the
costs for such data before expiration of remaining period of data exclusivity.
Where periods of exclusivity generally run only four to five years, such
circumstances are difficult in practice to realize.
(ii) Procedurally Perfect Market Exclusivity
Procedurally perfect market exclusivity is a statutory edict that prohibits
the FDA from approving for a time certain any competing product that is
the subject of a later-filer's application. This type of regulatory exclusivity
is absolute, and the recipient of such exclusivity is guaranteed to be the sole
purveyor in a given market for the duration of the exclusivity. Numerous
advantages obviously flow from the award of procedurally perfect market
exclusivity, not least of all the ability of the recipient to forecast with
minimized variables anticipated revenues for the exclusivity's duration. For
this and other reasons, some have suggested that this type of exclusivity
is "superior" to other types of regulatory and patent exclusivities in the
context of incentivizing biologic innovation.58 For reasons articulated, infra,
this position necessarily fails to appreciate complexities inherent in biologic
56 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)-(iv), (j)(5)(F)(iii)-(iv) (2006) (providing for three years of
data exclusivity for any approved drug that was the subject of an FDA application containing
data from new clinical studies that were essential to approval); § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii)
(awarding five years of data exclusivity for any approved drug deemed by the FDA to be a
New Chemical Entity ("NCE"), in that it contains an active pharmaceutical ingredient that
had not been approved previously by the FDA). In cases where a generic drug applicant seeks
to challenge any Orange Book-listed patent related to the NCE, however, the exclusivity is
reduced to four years. Id.
57 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7)(B) (West 2011).
58 See Morgan, supra note 31, at 98-io6.
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research, development, and manufacture. It also overlooks the dangers in
awarding such an impregnable market exclusivity.
.Procedurally perfect market exclusivity, by definition, can be awarded
only to a new, innovative product. Notably, Hatch-Waxman does not award
this type of regulatory exclusivity under any circumstance. 9 The ODA
awards a period of seven years.6° The award and duration of this exclusivity
was the topic of considerable Congressional debate in forging the terms of
the BPCIA,6' and the Act currently confers a period of twelve years.
6
1
(iii) Procedurally Imperfect Market Exclusivity
In contrast to the procedurally perfect market exclusivity, procedurally
imperfect market exclusivity is awarded only to later-filing applicants. The
"imperfect" designation connotes that the exclusivity awarded is not truly
exclusive. Rather, the award guarantees a later-filing applicant that the only
competing product it will face in a given market for a time certain is the
innovative product of the first-filer. This regulatory exclusivity is conferred
generally to incentivize later filers to file their FDA applications as quickly
as possible. The "first later-filer," by virtue of this exclusivity, will be free
to set a price for its product substantially lower than the first-filer (i.e., at
roughly "generic" prices) without fear of competition from other products
set at substantially the same price.
The Hatch-Waxman Act, as modified by the MMA, awards this
exclusivity to last no longer than 180 days from the date of commercial
launch of the first later-filer's product.63 The BPCIA allows for an exclusivity
of this type to last up to one year.
64
C. An Overview of Hatch-Waxman and lts Effect on the
Pharmaceutical Industry
Prior to enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the process of obtaining
regulatory approval for generic drugs was confounding at best. Until 1962,
for example, governing law required that all drugs, not just generic versions
of new drugs, be "approved for safety only. '65 Only with the "Kefauver"
Amendments passed in 1962 did the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
59 See Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 359-60.
60 Id. at 359; Orphan Drug Act, z U.S.C. §36occ(a) (2oo6).
61 See Carver et al., supra note 14, at 735-36.
62 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7)(A) (West zoi).
63 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2oo6).
64 42 U.S.C.A § 262(k)(6).
65 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug
Development Process, 54 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (999).
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require approval on the basis of both safety and efficacy.66 Even with the
Kefauver Amendments, however, there were still no provisions establishing
an abbreviated approval process for generic drugs identical to previously
approved innovator drugs.67 Generic drug companies therefore generally
had to file NDAs, thereby incurring the same costs of an innovator, to
show the safety and effectiveness of their generic products.61 Those parties
could submit "paper NDAs," or NDAs relying on already-published data
showing that the chemical comprising their proposed generic drugs was
both safe and effective, but such data was not always available for the
particular chemical sought to be approved. 69 Additionally, even if such data
were available, the FDA was nevertheless free to require additional clinical
studies addressing safety or efficacy issues arising out of that clinical data or
from adverse event reports presented during pendency of the application
itself.7" Indeed, after 1962, as many as 150 drugs no longer protected by
patents had no generic competition because companies would not invest
the resources necessary to collect the requisite data for approval of such
drugs.7" That stood to reason-seeking permission to market a generic
version of an FDA-approved drug product would often rival the cost of
obtaining permission of the reference product.
With the future of the generic pharmaceutical industry uncertain leading
up to the early 1980s,72 a movement in the Ninety-seventh Congress
(1980-82) caused the introduction of legislation that would further cast the
viability of the industry in doubt. The proposed legislation would have
permitted patent term extensions for pharmaceutical patents for periods
of up to seven years to compensate their owners for exclusivity lost during
the required FDA regulatory approval process.73 An amended version of
that legislation passed in the Senate, and it is said that only the efforts of
Representative Henry Waxman (D-Cal.) and then-Representative Albert
Gore, Jr. (D-Tenn.), with some help from inclement weather, prevented
its enactment.7 4 The bill fell only five votes short in the subsequent House
66 Id. at 187; Carver et al., supra note 14, at 674.
67 Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived
Their Usefulness? A Political, Legislative and Legal History of U.S. Law and Observations for the
Future, 39 IDEA 389,396 (1999).
68 Id. at 396-97.
69 Id. at 397; Carver et al., supra note 14, at 675.
70 Engelberg, supra note 67, at 397.
71 See Mossinghoff, supra note 65, at 187.
72 See Engelberg, supra note 67, at 397.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 397-98; Lourie, supra note 47, at 532.
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of Representatives tally; fog had prevented many in favor of the bill from
reaching Washington to cast their votes.7"
Around the beginning of the Ninety-eighth Congress, a district
court decision in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co., and the
subsequent appellate decision from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, ex poste and quite coincidentally demonstrated
the good fortune of that bill's failure. In the district court action, plaintiff
Roche Products, Inc. ("Roche"), the NDA holder for sleep medication
Dalmane (flurazepam hcl) and the'owner of U.S. Patent No. 3,299,053
("the '053 Patent") for that pharmaceutical compound, sued to enjoin Bolar
Pharmaceuticals Company ("Bolar") from manufacturing and using the
compound for purposes of preparing its own FDA application.7 6 Bolar did
not dispute that it was using flurazepam hcl for that purpose, and there was
no dispute that Bolar did not intend to commercially market its flurazepam
hcl product until after expiration of the '053 Patent.77
Roche contended that even though Bolar's manufacture and use
was strictly for purposes of obtaining government approval to market
a competing flurazepam hcl product, it nevertheless still constituted
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 7' The district court disagreed and
denied the injunction.7 9 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed.80 The
court reasoned that "use" as provided in section 271(a) of the Patent Act
covered Bolar's activities, and the judicially created "experimental use"
exception to that provision did not apply-Bolar's activities were for
commercial reasons, and as such they were sanctionable.8 ' As a result of this
holding, patent law would now prohibit generic pharmaceutical companies
from even preparing to seek FDA approval to market a generic competitor
to an FDA-approved, patent protected pharmaceutical compound until
the expiration of the relevant patents. This effectively would extend
market exclusivity for NDA holders beyond the statutory patent term to
include the period of time post-expiry of a patent that it took for a generic
applicant to both prepare its application and to obtain FDA approvalSZ
Had the legislation introduced in the Ninety-seventh Congress to extend
patent terms not been defeated, the Roche decision could have amounted
to a death knell for generic pharmaceuticals.
With the interests of appropriate patent term durations on the minds of
innovator companies, and with the interests of ensuring the preservation
75 Lourie, supra note 47, at 532.
76 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 572 F. Supp. 255, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 257.
79 Id. at z58.
8o Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.zd 858, 867 (Fed. Cir. I984).
81 Id. at 863.
82 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670 (i99o).
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of their industry on the minds of generic pharmaceutical companies, the
deliberation over what would become known as the Hatch-Waxman Act
began in earnest. The goal was to reconcile "two seemingly contradictory
objectives, namely, 1) to make lower-costing generic copies of approved
drugs more widely available and 2) to assure that there were adequate
incentives to invest in the development of new drugs."''
The resulting Hatch-Waxman statutory framework is an incredibly
complex, but arguably efficient, mechanism whereby parties seeking
to market generic versions of FDA-approved drugs can do so through
clearly established and well-defined means. Hatch-Waxman artfully
blends awards of patent exclusivity and regulatory exclusivity in an effort
to balance between its two seemingly contradictory objectives. The
innovative NDA holders are required to identify in their NDA any relevant
patent information to be listed in the FDA's Orange Book,' and potential
generic competitors have the obligation to certify to the FDA as part of their
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") that their product will not
infringe any valid and enforceable patents listed in the Orange Book.8 5 Pure
market exclusivity is then determined on the basis of applicable regulatory
exclusivity periods and any patent exclusivity that might be relevant.8 6
Also, to eliminate the potential effect that the Roche decision would have
had on the development of generic pharmaceutical drug candidates prior
to filing an ANDA, the Hatch-Waxman Act also created what is considered
to be "an artificial act of infringement" in creating 35 U.S.C. § 271(e).
8 7
Section 271(e) defines the filing of an ANDA with the FDA, where the
intent of the ANDA is to market a generic product prior to expiration of any
relevant patent, to be an act of patent infringement.8sThis is not to say that a
generic company is liable for patent infringement merely because it files an
ANDA-thus the "artificial" component to the act of patent infringement.
Rather, the statute was enacted merely to confer subject matter jurisdiction
in federal district court over a patent infringement action. The innovator
company thus is able to seek adjudication of potential patent infringement
against an ANDA filer before commercial launch of the generic competitor,
to the benefit of both the innovator and generic companies alike.
The innovator NDA holder enjoys numerable benefits from the various
provisions in Hatch-Waxman: First, it is entitled to receive notice of any
ANDA application- that raises a patent challenge against any of its patents
listed in the Orange Book, and it must receive such notice within 20
83 Engelberg, supra note 67, at 389.
84 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(I) (2oo6).
85 § 355(J)(2)(B)(iv)(II).
86 See § 355(b)( i); sources cited supra note 56.
87 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(2)(A) (2oo6).
88 Id.
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days from the date the FDA accepts such an ANDA for consideration. 9
This absolves the NDA holder from the sometimes arduous task of
monitoring markets to determine whether potential patent infringement
is afoot. Second, while the NDA holders are not obligated to bring suit,
they are incentivized do so within forty-five days of receiving notice.9°
If they do, a statutory 30-month stay is triggered that prohibits the FDA
from approving that ANDA during its pendency.91 The stay serves as a de
facto preliminary injunction against the ANDA applicant to preverit any
commercialization of any competing product for the duration of the stay.
Third, the Act effectively requires the ANDA applicant to offer the NDA
holder confidential access to proprietary documents necessary to form an
opinion as to whether and how the proposed generic drug product might
infringe any of the Orange Book-listed patents.9 Thus, the sometimes
combative and uncertain initial steps to patent litigation are accounted for
by statute. The NDA holder is effectively informed of potential bases for
bringing a patent infringement suit rather than having to discover them
independently.
The benefits enjoyed by generic pharmaceutical companies are
equally valuable, if not more so. Hatch-Waxman not only provides a path
certain by which generic companies may file less costly abbreviated new
drug applications, but the artificial act of infringement created by section
27 1(e) saves generic drug applicants from exposure to potentially crippling
damages awards for infringement. Again, section 271(e) permits patent
infringement suits by innovator companies prior to commercial launch
of a competing generic product. So long as the innovator files suit prior
to commercial launch of the generic competitor, no basis for damages
can be pled, and the only relief the innovator may seek is injunctive.
The reward of a 30-month stay of FDA approval for timely filing suit
incentivizes innovator companies to file early enough to prevent damages
from becoming an issue. The resulting worst case scenario for a generic
company should they lose the ensuing patent infringement suit, then, is
that it must delay its intended commercialization of its product until after
expiration of the relevant patents. While many generic drug companies will
state that this loss is not insignificant, none will contest that such a loss
pales in comparison to the damages award it would otherwise have to pay if
suit could not be brought prior to commercial launch.
Additional benefits are conferred upon generic drug applicants as well.
For instance, enactment of section 271(e) superseded the decision of the
89 2i U.S.C. § 355(b)(3)(B)-(C), (j)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii).
90 See § 355(c)(3)(C), (j)(5)(B)(iii).
91 Id.
92 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D)(i)(III) (West Supp. 2oiI); see also § 355(J)(5)(C)(i)(I)(cc)
(West Supp. 20i i) (barring generic applicant from seeking declaratory judgment of non-in-
fringement if "offer of confidential access" is not provided).
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Federal Circuit in Roche.93 Therefore, generic drug companies may now
manufacture and use patented pharmaceutical compounds and their uses
without fear of infringement, so long as the manufacture and use is solely
for purposes of preparing its ANDA application. 94 In certain circumstances,
generic applicants are also eligible for procedurally imperfect market
exclusivity periods, which keep other competing generic drug products
from themarket for up to 180 days from the time the first generic drug
product is commercially launched. 95 Considering the explosion in ANDA
filings within the last decade, one can safely say that sufficient incentives
have been enacted to enable the generic pharmaceutical industry to-thrive.
After considering the background of, and the incentives contained in,
the Hatch-Waxman Act, one must look at the data required as part of an
ANDA in order to understand the motivation to enact the BPCIA. Like
innovative drug products submitted as part of an NDA, generic drug
products must be deemed both safe and effective in order to merit FDA
approval for commercial marketing.97 Unlike the innovative drug products,
however, generic drug products (because of Hatch-Waxman) generally do
not have to be subject to the wealth of studies and clinical evaluations
required for a reference, innovator product. Instead, generic drug products
need only be sufficiently similar to the reference product (the latter already
having been FDA approved as safe and effective) to garner FDA approval.
Specifically, a generic drug applicant must show merely that the proposed
generic drug is comprised of the same active ingredient, is available in the
same strength and dosage form, and uses the same route of administration
as the reference drug.98 The generic drug applicant must also submit
"bioequivalence" data in support of its application." If the FDA deems the
generic drug to be bioequivalent to the innovative drug, the generic drug
receives a "Therapeutic Equivalent" designation and can be "substituted
for" the innovative drug with the expectation that it will produce the same
effect.' ° If bioequivalence cannot be established, the generic drug may
93 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 66i, 670-71 (199o).
94 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
.95 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iv) (zoo6).
96 David E.Korn et al.,A New History and Discussion of i8o" Exclusivity, 64 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 335,384-85 (2009).
97 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (b).
98 § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv).
99 § 355(J)(2)(A)(iv).
10O FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH ThERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS iii-
iv (31st ed. 2011 ) (on file with author).
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still be approved, but it would receive a lesser rating of "Pharmaceutical
Equivalent."'u °
The FDA defines "Bioequivalence" as follows:
the absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent to
which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical
equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at
the site of drug action when administered at the same molar
dose under similar conditions in an appropriately designed
study. Where there is an intentional difference in rate (e.g., in
certain extended release dosage forms), certain pharmaceutical
equivalents or alternatives may be considered bioequivalent if
-there is no significant difference in the extent to which the active
ingredient or moiety from each product becomes available at
the site of drug action. This applies only if the difference in the
rate at which the active ingredient or moiety becomes available
at the site of drug action is intentional and is reflected in the
proposed labeling, is not essential to the attainment of effective
body drug concentrations on chronic use, and is considered
medically insignificant for the drug.
02
While this definition is far from precise (e.g., "absence of significant
difference"), it is unmistakably clear in at least one respect. Using
"bioequivalence" as "an effective surrogate"103 to determine safety and
efficacy of a proposed generic drug product obviates the need for human
clinical trials-"bioequivalence ... [can be] demonstrated though relative
simple analyses such as blood level testing."'0 Therefore, a generic drug
applicant can forego the immense expense of conducting clinical trials to
prove the safety and efficacy of its proposed generic drug product, invest
far less in obtaining the necessary approvals to ready that product for
commercialization, and ultimately charge the customer significantly less
for its drug than the innovator would for its own.
These cost savings have passed through to consumers. Since its
enactment, the Hatch-Waxman Act has saved the public, and notably the
government, hundreds of billions of dollars. In the last decade alone, over
$700 billion in savings were realized "without the disastrous effects on
pharmaceutical innovation that were predicted when [the ANDA/generic]
pathway was initially being developed."'0 5 Indeed, investment in research
ioi Id.
102 Bioavailability and Bioequivalence Requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 320.I(e) (2011).
103 See Mossinghoff, supra note 65, at 191.
104 How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG. (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.bio.org/node/53.
1o5 Hearings, supra note 14, at I z6 (Nov. 2, 2oio testimony of Sara Crager).
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and development by innovator pharmaceutical companies has steadily and
rapidly increased since the Act's passage in the 98th Congress. 106
Despite the success it has achieved in promoting drug innovation
while lowering costs to consumers for drug products, Hatch-Waxman is
not without its limitations. Most notably, and as noted earlier, the Hatch-
Waxman Act was not designed to accommodate abbreviated applications
for biologic medicinal therapies. Indeed, Hatch-Waxman amended
and supplemented provisions of the FDCA, the Act that has required
government approval to market synthetic drugs since its passage in
1938.107 Hatch-Waxman did not affect the PHSA, the 1944 revision and
recodification of the Biologics Act of 1902, under which innovative biologic
medical therapies have been subject to governmental scrutiny.08 However,
limiting Hatch-Waxman's reach to synthetic drugs only was not mere
oversight. Understanding the fundamental differences between drugs
and biologics reveals that regulating drug and biologic treatments under
different sections of the United States Code is not a result of stereotypical
government inefficiencies.
I. SYNTHETIC DRUG vs. BIOLOGIC FORMULATION: WHY HATCH-WAXMAN
CANNOT ACCOMMODATE BIOSIMILARS APPLICATIONS
While drugs and biologics are both used to treat various disease states
and must be FDA-approved for such use before commercial marketing
in the United States, the similarities arguably end there. Nearly all aspects
of biologics differ from drugs': "The inherent differences between these
two classes include product and active agent sources, identity, structure,
composition, manufacturing methods and equipment, intellectual property,
formulation, handling, dosing, regulation, and marketing." 0 Because the
purpose of this article is to provide the reader only with sufficient knowledge
to understand the inapplicability of the Hatch-Waxman statutory and
regulatory regime to biologics, not to explain in exhaustive detail the
myriad differences between the two classes of medicinal therapies, most of
these differences are irrelevant here. For this purpose, a brief examination
of the differences in structure and composition, product and active agent
sources, and manufacturing methods and equipment will suffice.
With respect to structure and composition, drugs are smaller and far less
complexly organized than biologics. Drugs generally have very few atoms
comparatively, and their structures are easily displayed graphically by
1O6 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 30, at 17.
107 See Carver et al., supra note 14, at 671, 673.
Io8 See id. at 677, 682-83.
IO9 Ronald A. Rader, (Re)definingBiopharnaceutical, z6 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 743,744
(2008).
IIo Id.
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way of diagrams showing bonds of specific atoms."' By contrast, biologics
contain a far greater number of atoms, having m6lecular masses "two to
three orders of magnitude greater" than drug counterparts, "and involve
many additional levels of structural complexity." "Il The complex nature
of biologics is attributable to many factors', including the fact that biologics
"invariably' consist of more than one molecular entity, and are usuallymixtures of many closely related molecular species."113 Some biologics are
even more complex and are impossible to completely characterize with
current technology."'
To better illustrate the differences in size and structural complexity
when comparing drugs with biologics, consider the comparison of Aspirin
(drug) and Aranesp® (biologic):
Aspirin, perhaps less commonly known as acetylsalicylic acid, is an
"analgesic, anti-inflammatory, antipyretic and . . . inhibitor of platelet
aggregation."" 5 'In common parlance, Aspirin is used for pain relief,
reduction of swelling, reduction of fever, and to a lesser extent for blood
thinning. The structural composition of Aspirin is easily described as
C9H804 , its molecular weight is equal to approximately 180.1574 Daltons,
and its skeletal diagram is uncomplicated as shown in Figure 1:
COOH
0 OCOCH3
Aspirin
Figure 1116
Aranesp®, less commonly known as darbepoetin alfa, is an erythropoiesis-
stimulating protein manufactured and commercialized by Amgen, Inc. that
is FDA-approved for the treatment of anemia (i.e., a shortage of red blood
cells or hemoglobin in the body) stemming from either chronic kidney
I I I LUBERT STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 2-3 (2d ed. t981).
I 12 Rader, supra note 109, at 744. See generally STRYER, supra note I I I, at I 1-37 (providing
further explanation of this difference).
113 Austi. Gov't Dep't of Health & Ageing, Discussion Paper on Similar Biological Me-
dicinalProducts, PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME (July 1, 201o), http://www.pbs.gov.au/info/
publication/factsheets/shared/2o o-o7-o i-Discussionpaper_onSBMPs.
114 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, FDA REGULATION OF FOLLOW--ON BIOLOGICS 2 (201o), available
at http://www.primaryim'mune.orgadvocacy-center/ dfs/health-care-reform/Biosimilars_
CongressionalResearchServiceRepon.pdf.
I15 What is Aspirin?: The Chemistry of Aspirin, ASPIRIN FOUND., http://www.aspirin-
foundation.com/what/chemistry.html (last visited Aug. 13, 201 I).
i16 Id.
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disease or the effects of certain chemotherapy. "' Aranesp® is designed
to stimulate erythropoiesis (the process of red blood cell [erythrocyte]
production) by the same mechanism as endogenous erythropoietin
("EPO"), 11 a cytokine hormone and glycoprotein ordinarily produced
naturally from endothelial cells in human kidneys, and to a lesser extent,
the liver."9 Amgen's manufactured EPO resembles endogenous EPO, and
can be used generally in instances where a human's natural production
of endogenous EPO is deficient.2 0 (EPO, such as recombinant human
EPO ["rHuEPO"] is also the substance used by some high-performance
athletes for purposes of "blood doping," or creating extra oxygen-carrying
hemoglobin found in red blood cells for prolonged endurance.)'
Unlike Aspirin, the structural composition of Aranesp® or any other
EPO is difficult to describe. Without pictures or diagrams, it is realistically
impractical.' According to Paolo DaSilva and David Marcey of the Biology
Department of California Lutheran University, a brief description of EPO
includes the following:
EPO contains a four-helical bundle with a topology shared with
other cytokines. The four helices of this bundle are termed A, B,
C, and D. The A and D helices are linked by a disulphide bridge.
117 Highlights of Prescribing Information for Aranesp, FDA (June 2011), http://www.
accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda-docslabel/2o 1/10395 i Origis5 1 73 - 10395 Orig i s52581bl.pdf.
i18 Id.
i 19 Paolo DaSilva & David Marcey, Erythropoietin Bound to the Extracellular Domains of
Two EPO Receptors, (2011), http:lwww.callutheran.edu/BioDev/omm/mol/epolepo.htm.
120 See Highlights of Prescribing Infomation for Aranesp, supra note 117.
1i See, e.g., Siamak T Nabili, Erythropoietin (EPO) & the EPO Test, MEDICINENET.coM,
http://www.medicinenet.com/erythropoietin/page3.htm (last visited Aug. 14, zo).
122 Even the U.S. Court of Appeals has recognized as much, notingthat "providing a
description in written form is not practicable" for biologic inventions. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F3d 956,970 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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The B and C helices are linked by a short loop. In addition to the
A-D helices, EPO contains two short helices, B' and C'.
123
See Figure 2:
Helix B "Short Loop"
Helix B'
HHelix '
Heli D
Disulphide Bridge
Figure 2124
DaSilva and Marcey explain, "The structure of EPO is further
stabilized by numerous hydrophobic interactions. For example, aromatic
and.hydrophobic amino acids of the D-helix pack against hydrophobic
residues of helices A, B, and C, helping to form the hydrophobic core of
EPO."'121 See Figure 3:
Figure 3 (Graphic representation of hydrophobic interactions within
EPO)
12 6
As is evident from even a cursory comparison of Figure 1 with Figures
2 and 3, the structural differences between Aspirin (drug) and an EPO like
Aranesp® (biologic) are vast. Aspirin contains only a benzene ring, three
123 DaSilva & Marcey, supra note i 19.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. (top view).
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additional carbon atoms, eight hydrogen atoms, and four oxygen atoms;" 7
EPO, among other components, contains 165 amino acids and multiple
carbohydrate (oligosaccharide) side chains."2 8 The difference in the sizes
is equally disparate-the molecular weight of Aranesp® is approximately
37,000 Daltons, roughly 205 times greater than Aspirin.2 9 Pictorially, the
relative size and complexity of the two products can be seen in Figure 4
below
Figure 4 (Comparison between structures of aspirin and erythropoietin)'-3
The disparities in size and structure between Aspirin and Aranesp® are
not unique to these products, and they are characteristic of the differences
between the classes of drug and biologics at large. "Compared with
drugs, bio[logics] are composed of many more atoms .... Most bio[logics]
involve proteins or other biopolymers comprising many, usually hundreds
or thousands, of chemical subunits or monomers (e.g., amino acids or
nucleotides), with each subunit a potential site for structural variation."''
Simply put, biologics are immeasurably more complex in size and structure
than are drugs. 3 '
In addition to the disparity in size and structure between the two classes,
the disparity in product and active agent sources among drugs and biologics,
as well as the differences in their respective manufacturing methods and
equipment, are no less significant. Active agents of biologics, for instance,
127 See What is Aspirin?, supra note i 15.
128 See DaSilva & Mareey, supra note i 19; Wael Ebied, Production of Biosimilas/Biogener-
ies in Developing Countries: Chalknges and Opportunities, SEDICO Case Study Egypt (Oct. 2oo),
eps-egypt.net/files/pdt /law/drebid.ppt [hereinafter Ebied Presentation].
129 See Highlights of Prescribing Informaation for Aranesp, supra note 117.
130 Ebied Presentation, supra note 128.
13 1 Rader, supra note i09, at 744.
132 See Austl. Gov't Dep't of Health & Ageing, supra note 113.
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generally are "a complex mixture of molecular subspecies with a range of
variations in structural aspects (e.g., due to amino acid substitutions, twists
and turns in chain structures, intra- and inter-chain linkages, side-chain
modifications and aggregation)," and they are therefore extraordinarily
difficult to analyze or sometimes identify.'33 Active agents of drugs, in
contrast, are easily identified and analyzed. This difference stems largely
from the way in which these classes of drugs are manufactured.
Manufacturing a drug is, relatively speaking, quite straightforward.
Typically it involves chemical synthesis, "made by combining specific
chemical ingredients in an ordered process."I3' The process is very
predictable, easily repeatable, and largely unremarkable. In some cases,
such as in the formulation of Aspirin, the process is so easy as to be available
on the internet,135 and student laboratory kits are available to make it at
home.'36 In the uncommon instances where drugs are made at least in part
from specific biological, rather than chemical, ingredients, those ingredients
are usually exposed to conditions (extreme heat) and involve materials
(solvents) during the manufacturing process such that any organism or other
biological molecule that might otherwise be present in the drug would be
destroyed. 37 And with'no organism or biological molecule in the finished
drug product, the "inherent diversity, randomness and complexity" found
in biological components of medicinal therapies are eliminated.'38
Manufacturing a biologic is exponentially more complicated, ostensibly
by definition: "A biologic is manufactured in a living system such as a
microorganism, or plant or animal cells."' I3 9 The process involves several
steps, and even a mere overview of the protocol often -used to develop a
biologic is indicative of the stark contrast between drugs and biologics. It
also reveals why the bioequivalencbe measure used to identify and approve
generic drugs under Hatch-Waxman is inappropriate to extend to the
identification, and approval of biosimilars.
To manufacture a biologic, a seven-step process generally is employed:
host cell development; establishment of a cell bank; protein production;
purification; analysis; formulation; and finally, storage and handling.14°
The specifics of each step are far beyond the scope of this article, but the
133 Rader, supra note Io9, at 745.
134 See How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, supra note 104.
135 See Aspirin, How PRODUCTs ARE MADE, http://www.madehow.com/Volume- I/Aspirin.
html (last visited Aug. 13, 2011).
136 See Synthesis of Aspirin- Student Laboratory Kit, FLINN SCL, INC., http://www.flinnsci.
com/store/Scripts/prodView.asp?idproduct= 682o&noList= I (last visited Aug. I, 201 I).
137 Rader, supra note IO9, at 744.
138 Id.
139 See How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, supra note 1o4.
140 Siriwan Chaisomboonpan, Biosimilar (Dec. 25, 2oo8), www.dmsc.moph.go.th/
webroot/drug/km/docs/Biosimilar.ppt [hereinafter Chaisomboonpan Presentation].
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yield of the protocol is significant: through identification and selection of
a particular human gene sequence, introduction of that gene sequence to
a host cell, production by that host cell of a complex protein structure, and
processing of that protein structure into the final biologic product, it follows
that the final biologic product necessarily will be unique to the particular
host cell selected in the initial stages of production (as well as. a function
of particular conditions to which the particular host cell is exposed during
protein production, and of numerous other factors).14' It is for this reason
that "for biologics, 'the product is the process."'
1 42
Consider the manufacturing processes of Aranesp®, for example. The
particular gene sequence selected and. isolated is erythropoietin, and
that gene is introduced into a Chinese Hamster Ovary ("CHO") cell for
development. 43 The resultant byproduct of that CHO cell is'unique to
that very cell.144 The same erythropoietin gene sequence introduced into
different CHO cells will admittedly result in very similar byproducts,
but they will not be identical.141 Moreover, the same erythropoietin
gene sequence introduced to the same CHO cell can result in similar
but ultimately different byproducts if the conditions to which the CHO
cell is exposed are varied during protein production."4 And if the steps
conducted in subsequent purification of the protein, formulation, and
even storage and handling vary, the resultant biologic product will vary
accordingly. ' 47 To prevent these variations to the extent possible, "biologics
manufacturers [like Amgen] . . . tightly control the source and nature of
starting materials, and consistently employ hundreds of process controls
that assure predictable manufacturing outcomes."
'1 4
1
As alluded to earlier, however, employment of hundreds of process
controls by one manufacturer will not prevent variation among biologics
where they are produced by different manufacturers. An. example of such
variation can be seen in Figure 5, infra. Figure 5 compares pictorially
recombinant human erythropoietiri ("rHuEPO") manufactured by a third
party with Amgen's Aranesp®. 49 Both are made by way of introducing the
erythropoietin gene sequence into CHO cells; both are very similar in
appearance, but they are not the same. 50 Aranesp®, as shown in Figure 5,
141 Id.
142 See How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, supra note io4 (quoting another source).
143 See Highlights of Prescribing Information for Aranesp, supra note, 117.
x44 See Ebied Presentation, supra note 128.
145 See Chaisomboonpan Presentation, supra note 140.
146 Id. at 8.
147 Id. at 9, 13; see How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, supra note 1 04.
148 See How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, supra note 104.
149 See Ebied Presentation, supra note 128.
150 Compare id., and Highlights of Prescribing Information for Aranesp, supra note 1 17, with
EPO, Human Recombinant, Ultra Pure, CELLSCIENCES.COM, http://www.cellsciences.com/PDF/
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contains five N-linked oligosaccharide chains, whereas rHuEPO contains
only three. The clinical significance of this difference may be insubstantial,
but it may not be. Without lengthy and costly evaluation of the potentially
clinically significant differences between the two biologics, deeming one
to be "biosimilar" to the other could be considered irresponsible. Certainly
deeming one "bioequivalent" or "generic" to the other would be.'
Figure 5 (Comparison between structures of rHuEPO and Aranesp®) 2
Therein lies the problem with applying Hatch-Waxman standards
for bioequivalence to biologics: The complex nature of manufacturing,
characterizing, and evaluating biologics resulting from necessarily different
processes (e.g., different host cells, different ambient environments
during production) among different manufacturers, where "the process
is the product,"'5 3 makes bioequivalence determinations unrealistic.
From merely a cost perspective, conducting the tests necessary for a
biologic to be deemed bioequivalent would be prohibitive-the end cost
of producing a "bioequivalent biologic" would be roughly the same as
producing an innovative biologic.5 4 The cost of producing an innovative
biologic, however, is precisely what made the passage-and what makes
the success-of a streamlined approval process for biosimilars so critical.
The expense involved in manufacturing biologics-including costs for
the maintenance of the requisite process controls to ensure production of
consistent biologic products, the lengthy and numerous clinical studies
necessary to accurately assess safety and efficacy, and even the state of the
art assays required to merely categorize the biologic-all result in rendering
the average annual cost of a biologic treatment regimen to be 72 times
CRE6ooB.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2010.
151 See Hearings, supra note 14, at 16-18, 22-28, 40-42, 97-101, 199-202, 308-1o (Nov.
2, 2oo testimony of Marcia Boyle, Janet Wyatt, Seth Ginsberg, Laszlo Endrenyi, Gregory
Schimizzi, and James Sykes); see also JOHNSON, supra note 114.
152 Ebied Presentation, supra note 128.
153 See Rader, supra note 109, at 745-46.
154 Hearings, supra note 14, at 116 (Nov. 2, 20 o testimony of Sara Crager).
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more expensive than its small molecule drug treatment counterpart.'s The
BPCIA is supposed to reduce this disparity. Unfortunately, the terms of the
current BPCIA may not result in such a reduction.
III. THE TERMS OF THE BPCIA AND CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF HATCH-
WAXMAN
In its broadest sense, the BPCIA can be viewed as containing three
distinct but interrelated components. One outlines the necessary
information biosimilars applicants must provide to the FDA as part of their
application (hereinafter, "subsection (k) applications"); a second provides
for the regulatory exclusivities that will be awarded to either initial biologics
applicants ("reference product sponsors") or first subsection (k) applicants;
and the third outlines the patent litigation framework that will apply
should such a suit result from the filing of a subsection (k) application.
Each distinct component of the BPCIA will be addressed and compared to
the corresponding Hatch-Waxman provisions in turn.
A. The Abbreviated Applications
The very purpose of the BPCIA was to create an abbreviated FDA
approval process for biosimilars, and the Act provides potential subsection
(k) applicants two options from which to choose. The first option allows
for an applicant to submit its proposed "Follow-on" biologic ("FOB") for
designation merely as a "biosimilar."'' 6 The second permits the applicant
to submit its proposed FOB to heightened scrutiny to potentially receive
the designation of "interchangeable."'5 7 In either case, the applicant must
provide considerable information. Analytical studies, animal studies, and/or
clinical studies comprise only one subset of the data that must be included
within any subsection (k) application.'58 Information demonstrating that
the FOB utilizes the same mechanism(s) of action and the same route of
administration as the reference product is also required.'59 In addition, the
subsection (k) applicant must verify that the FOB is to be used only for the
same conditions as previously approved for the reference product, that the
dosage form and strength of the FOB is the same as the reference product,
155 Gopal Dasika, Biologics with a Greater Reach, BIOSPECTRUM, Nov. 6, 2oo9, http://
biospectrumindia.ciol.com/content/BioSpecial/io91 1o6 2.asp.
I56 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(z)(A) (West 2oi i).
157 § 262(k)(2)(B), (k)(4); see also Request for Comments, supra note z, at 61497-98.
158 § z62(k)(z)(A)(i)(I).
159 § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II), (IV).
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and that the facility in which the proposed FOB is manufactured meets
applicable government standards. 60
. For an FOB to achieve an interchangeability determination, additional
data is required. Beyond the information required to show that the FOB
is "biosimilar to the reference product," a subsection (k) applicant must
provide sufficient information to demonstrate that the FOB "can be
expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference product in
any given patient."' 6' For those FOBs that will be administered more than
once in any given patient, the subsection (k) applicant must also show that
the patient would respond to repeated treatment alternating between the
reference product and the FOB, or switching from the reference product
to the FOB, in the same manner as he or she would if given repeated
treatment with the reference product alone.
16
The options and requirements of the BPCIA for abbreviated biologics
applications essentially mirror those contained in Hatch-Waxman for
abbreviated drug applications, except that the BPCIA codifies in statutory
language what the FDA has imposed through its delegated regulatory
powers. 63 The distinction between the designations "biosimilar" and
"interchangeable" under the BPCIA is roughly akin to the distinction
made by the FDA in determining whether a drug is a "Pharmaceutical
Equivalent" or a "Therapeutic Equivalent" under Hatch-Waxman.l 4 As
will be addressed in detail in Parts V and VI, however, this is one of the
most glaring flaws of the BPCIA. The legislature seems to have presumed
that because the distinction between similarity and substitutability can be
made in the synthetic drug context, it follows that a similar distinction can
be made with biologics. This presumption is potentially fatal to the success
of the BPCIA.
B. The Market Exclusivities
The BPCIA appears to contain generous incentives to stimulate biologic
innovation as well as competition. As a reward for innovation, the BPCIA
provides both data exclusivity and procedurally perfect market exclusivity
for any reference product that ultimately obtains FDA approval. 6 '
16o § 262(k)(z)(A)(i)(III)-(V).
161 § 262(k)(4)(A).
162 § 262(k)(4)(B).
163 Compare § 262(k)(2) (providing for "biosimilar" and "interchangeable" designations),
with OrangeBook Preface, supra note ioo (providing for "pharmaceutical equivalent" and "ther-
apeutic equivalent" designations).
164 Compare § 262(k)(2) (providing for "biosimilar" and "interchangeable" designations),
with Orange Book Preface, supra note oo (providing for "pharmaceutical equivalent" and "ther-
apeutic equivalent" designations).
165 See § 262(k)(7)(A)-(B).
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The data exclusivity provision forbids a subsection (k) application from
submitting its application any earlier than four years after the date the
reference product was first approved by the FDA."6 The procedurally
perfect.market exclusivity provision bars the FDA from approving any
subsection (k) application for a period of twelve years following FDA
approval of the reference product.'6 7 Interestingly, the practical effect of
concomitant data and procedurally perfect market exclusivities is that the
data exclusivity provision is rendered almost entirely superfluous. From a
market perspective, no competitor can enter the market for twelve years
regardless of whether data exclusivity applies. Query then what purpose
the data exclusivity provision serves.
To reward early biologic competition, the BPCIA awards the first
subsection (k) application that successfully obtains an interchangeability
determination up to one year of procedurally imperfect market exclusivity.'68
When viewed in context of the forfeiture provisions surrounding the grant
of exclusivity, however, the grant is completely illusory. This is another of
the most glaring flaws of the BPCIA, and it, too, will be addressed in detail
in Part IV, infra.
By comparison, all grants of exclusivity conferred under the Hatch-
Waxman statutory regime are real. Hatch-Waxman confers no procedurally
perfect market exclusivities, and instead it relies on a combination of patent
exclusivity and data exclusivity to incentivize synthetic drug innovation.
169
To encourage synthetic drug competition, Hatch-Waxman provides for up
to 180 days of procedurally imperfect market exclusivity. 70
C. The Contemplated Patent Litigation Framework
The contemplated patent litigation framework contained in the BPCIA
comprises nearly a third of the total provisions of the Act itself.'7' This
component of the Act constitutes a radical departure from the patent
litigation framework contemplated under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Indeed,
the litigation framework of the BPCIA constitutes a radical departure from
traditional patent litigation procedure in any respect, for reasons that will
be readily apparent.
Like Hatch-Waxman, the BPCIA has modified the Patent Act such
that the filing of an abbreviated application with the FDA shall constitute
i66 § 262(k)(7)(B).
167 § 262(k)(7)(A).
168- § 262(k)(6).
169 Seesupra note 56 and accompanying text.
170 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iv) (2006).
171 Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § z6z(l) (West 201 I), with Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. i 11-148, § 700(b), 124 Star. 119, 804 (201o) (to be codified at 4z U.S.C.
§ 27 1(e)).
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an artificial act of patent infringement, presuming of course that relevant
patent rights exist. 7 Also like Hatch-Waxman, the BPCIA requires that
upon FDA receipt of the abbreviated application, the applicant has twenty
days to notify the reference product sponsor of the FDA's acceptance of the
application." 3 The remainder of the BPCIA litigation framework diverges
significantly from what has been proposed and practiced under the Hatch-
Waxman Act.
Under the BPCIA, the next step is the first in a series of steps designed to
serve as pre-litigation "good faith" negotiations. Recall that under Hatch-
Waxman the NDA holder has the obligation to submit to the FDA patents
relevant to the approved product for listing in the Orange Book.174 The
ANDA applicant therefore receives notice that the manufacture, use, sale,
or offer for sale of the product described in any ANDA submission might
result in infringement of one or more of the Orange Book-listed patents.
Under the BPCIA, the subsection (k) applicant receives no like notice.7 5
The Orange Book protocol of Hatch-Waxman has been eliminated.
The BPCIA instead requires that the reference product sponsor and the
subsection (k) applicant engage in serial communications to identify
the patents that should be subject to litigation. 6 Further, the BPCIA
contemplates potentially two separate patent infringement actions for
each subsection (k) application submitted. 77 An overview of the protocol
follows:
Step 1: The FDA accepts the subsection (k) application
for filing.17
Step 2: The subsection - (k) applicant notifies the
reference product sponsor about the subsection (k)
application within 20 days of step V
Step 3: Within 60 days of receipt of notice, the reference
product sponsor provides the subsection (k) applicant
172 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 7002(C)(1).
173 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(2) (West 2oi).
174 See 21 U.S.C. § 35 5(b)(i) (2oo6).
175 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(1) (West 2011) (leaving to private parties the task of
identifying patents relevant to any BLA and subsequent subsection (k) application).
176 See id.
177 See id. § 262(1)(6), (8).
178 Id. § 262(l)(2)
179 Id.
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with a list of patents potentially infringed by the product
described in the subsection (k) application. 8
Step 4: Within 60 days of receiving the reference product
sponsor's list, the subsection (k) applicant provides its own
list of any patents it believes are relevant to the application
but that may have been omitted from the reference
product sponsor's list. The subsection (k) applicant also
must provide a detailed statement concerning its non-
infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability positions.",
Step 5: Within 60 days of receiving the subsection (k)
applicant's list and statement, the reference product
sponsor must provide the subsection (k) applicant with a
detailed statement concerning its infringement positions
and a response to any invalidity or unenforceability
arguments previously raised by the subsection (k)
applicant. 8
Step 6: After the subsection (k) applicant's receipt of the
statement described in step 5, the parties must engage in
"good faith negotiations" in an attempt to agree on a list
of patents that should be the subject of an "immediate
patent infringement action."'83 The parties have 15 days
to negotiate.' 4 If the parties reach an agreement on the
inventory of patents that should serve as the basis for an
immediate action, then the parties skip Step 7, and the
reference product sponsor has 30 days from the date of
agreement to bring suit on the identified patents under
Step 8.185 Any patents previously identified in Steps 3 and
4 that are not part of the immediate action may be brought
in a later action.' 6 If the parties fail to reach agreement
within 15 days, they proceed to Step 7.187
Step 7: In light of the parties' disagreement about which
patents to litigate immediately, the BPCIA provides that
i8o § 262(l)(3)(A)(i).
181 § 262(I)(3)(B)(i)&(ii)(I).
I82 § 262()(3)(C).
183 § 262(I)(4)(A).
184 § 262(I)(4)(B).
I85 § 262(I)(6)(A).
186 § 262(I)(8)(B).
187 § 262(l)(4)(B).
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the subsection (k) applicant shall, after reaching 15 days
of disagreement, provide the reference patent sponsor
with the number-and just the total number-of patents
that it believes should be the subject of immediately
litigation.188 After no later than five days, the parties are
to simultaneously exchange identification of the specific
patents, up to the number provided by the subsection
(k) applicant, that will be litigated immediately."9 For
example, if the subsection (k) applicant provided the
number "1," then each side may select one patent to
litigate immediately. Because each. side may select a
different patent (depending on the number of relevant
patents at issue disclosed in Steps 3 and 4), a total of
two patents might be litigated. Each party might select
a different patent for immediate litigation. In the event
the subsection .(k) applicant selects the number "0,"
the reference product sponsor may select one patent
for immediate litigation.'O Any patents not selected for
immediate litigation at this stage are then eligible to serve
as the subject of a second litigation. 191
Step 8: The reference product-sponsor must file suit
within 30 days of either the date the parties reached an
agreement on the patents to be litigated immediately,
or if no agreement was reached in Step 6, from the date
188 § 262(l)(5)(A).
189 § 262()(5)(B).
i9o § 262()(5)(B)(ii)(II).
191 § z62(l)(8)(B).
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the parties exchanged identification of the patents to be
litigated immediately. 92
An illustration of the lengthy and complicated pre-litigation framework
of the BPCIA described thus far is depicted below in Figure 6:
Mont M~e MA 2UAV-
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192 § 262(1)(6)(A), (B).
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of the second litigation is to account for any patent identified during the
good-faith negotiations of steps 3 and 4, supra, but not asserted as part of
the immediate action. 193 The second litigation would also include claims
for the infringement of any patents that might have issued only after the
parties identified relevant patents in Steps 3 and 4.'94 The timing of the
second action may occur at any time between the subsection (k) applicant's
announcement that it intends to launch commercially its FOB product
and the time of the actual commercial launch.'95 The BPCIA requires the
subsection (k) applicant to give the reference product sponsor notice of its
intention to launch no later than 180 days before the intended date. 96 A
193 See id. § 262(I)(8)(B).
194 Id.
195 § 262(I)(8)(A), (B).
196 § 262(i)(8)(A).
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graphic illustration of the circumstances that might surround this second
litigation is represented in Figure 7.
'~ Were any patents
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Figure 7 (Overview of BPCIA Litigations, Part 11)
IV M-IE FLAWS OF THE. BPCIA AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONCS
A. Flaws
1. Designation of Interchangeability.-Not least among the flaws contained
within the current BPCIA is whether it is realistic to expect the FDA
to fashion guidelines by which a proposed FOB can be deemed
"interchangeable" as opposed to merely "biosimilar. ' ' 197 As explained in
197 See Hearings, supra note 14, at 90--95 (Nov. 2, 2010 testimony of Marcia Boyle, Janet
2011-20121
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Part II, supra, a proposed biologic is immeasurably more difficult to evaluate
than is a drug. Yet the BPCIA would have the FDA require sufficient clinical
data of a subsection (k) applicant such that the FDA could determine
conclusively whether a proposed FOB "can be expected to produce the
same clinical result as the reference product in any given patient." '9 Such
a showing is not even required in the drug context, as Hatch-Waxman
is entirely silent in distinguishing between Therapeutic Equivalents
(interchangeables) and Pharmaceutical Equivale nts (biosimilars). 19 In the
context of biologics, demonstrating interchangeability under this standard
currently is a practical impossibility2 00 Moreover, even if the standard is
achievable, it will come at a cost that makes a subsection (k) application
fiscally irresponsible to pursue.
A great deal has been published already imploring the FDA to require
robust clinical data to accompany any subsection (k) application.2 1 Many
believe that bestowing a designation of even mere biosimilarity-let
alone interchangeability-would be scientifically irresponsible without
such clinical data. 02 The demand for data is unsurprising, again, given the
complexities inherent in most biologic products. The difficulty the FDA
faces, however, is that the greater the amount of clinical data required in a
subsection (k) application, the less fiscal sense it makes for a party to file a
subsection (k) application. Indeed, if the cost is too great for a subsection
(k) applicant to demonstrate biosimilarity-whether because the clinical
trials potentially required are too lengthy and costly to conduct, or for
any other reason-the subsection (k) applicant would be better served in
pursuing other options.
One alternative a prospective subsection (k) applicant might consider, for
example, would be to submit its own Biologic License Application ("BLA")
to the FDA instead of a subsection (k) application. Prior to enactment of
the BPCIA, the PHSA required an FDA-approved BLA of every biologic
prior to its commercial marketing in the United States.2 0 3 The BPCIA now
provides merely an alternative approval pathway for FDA applicants with
FOBs; it is not the only approval pathway for such a product. Any biologic
may still be approved as the subject of a BLA. As such, if the cost to submit
Wyatt, Seth Ginsberg, Laszlo Endrenyi, Gregory Schimizzi, and James Sykes); see also JOHN-
SON, supra note 114, at Io- lI.
198 42 U.S.C.A. § 26z(k)(4)(A)(ii) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
199 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006) (no distinction between Therapeutic and Pharma-
ceutical Equivalents); see also Orange Book Preface, supra note 1oo (where distinction is made
by regulatory guidance).
2oo See Steven Kozlowski et al., Developing the Nation's Biosimilars Program, 5 NEw ENG. J.
Mt. 365, 385 (201 i) (noting that advancements in technology currently permit assessment of
whether products are merely "highly similar").
201 See Hearings, supra note 14; JOHNSON, supra note 114.
2o2 Hearings, supra note 14; JOHNSON, supra note 114.
203 § 262(a)(i).
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a subsection (k) application becomes just as great as it would be to submit
a BLA, then the incentive to submit a subsection (k) application will be
eliminated. Moreover, prospective subsection (k) applicants opting to file
BLAs would avoid the twelve-year procedurally perfect market exclusivity
period that they would otherwise face, so they could commercialize their
FOBs more quickly. Further still, they would not subject themselves to the
otherwise required pre-litigation good-faith negotiations of the BPCIA,
and they could avoid the multiple patent infringement suits contemplated
by the BPCIA. The ensuing "brand-to-brand" competition that would
result from filing a BLA instead of a subsection (k) application would make
immeasurably more financial sense to any FOB applicant."
The good news is that the FDA is all too aware of this conundrum, and
it has sofight assistance from the public at large to recommend courses of
action in order to balance successfully the need for subsection (k) clinical
data with the need to make the filing of subsection (k) applications a
financially responsible option."' 5 The bad news is that regardless of the data
required to demonstrate biosimilarity of an FOB with a reference product,
it will be even more costly to obtain a designation of"interchangeability."" °
And unless a party can obtain status as "interchangeable," which would
permit a pharmacist to fill any prescription for the reference product with
the FOB without requiring physician approval," 7 the incentive to file a
subsection (k) application is faint at best.
2. Illusory Incentives.-Another problem inherent in the current BPCIA is
that, even if the standard to obtain an "interchangeability" determination
is fiscally responsible to pursue, the incentive to be the first subsection
(k) applicant to achieve that designation is illusory. Recall that the BPCIA
awards procedurally imperfect market exclusivity to the first subsection
(k) applicant to receive the "interchangeability" designation for its FOB.
The exact duration of the procedurally imperfect market exclusivity
depends on specific circumstances outlined in the Act, but in no event will
it last longer than one year.108 Section 262(k)(6) pfovides the conditions
upon which the duration of the exclusivity period hihges., It specifically
204 See Hearings, supra note 14, at 117-18 (Nov. 2, 2010 testimony of Sara Crager).
205 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., FDA Requests Input on
Development of User Fee Program for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biological Products
(May 9, 2o1 I), available at http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/
ucm254572.htm#.TqxjF-rJpwk.email; Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of
2oo9; Options for a User Fee Program for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biological Product
Applications for Fiscal Years 2013 Through 2017; Request for Comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 27,062
(May 1O,zoi 0).
206 Compare § 262(k)(2)(A), with § 262(k)(4).
207 Request for Comments, supra note 2, at 61,498.
2o8 § 262(k)(6).
209 Id.
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prohibits the FDA from making a determination of "interchangeability"
for a second FOB until the earliest of three "triggering events" occurs-A)
the one year anniversary of the first commercial marketing of the first
interchangeable FOB; B) eighteen months have passed since either (i) a
final court decision on all patents included in an (1)(6) litigation or (ii) a
dismissal with or without prejudice of such an action; or C) (i) forty-two
months have passed since the first FOB was deemed interchangeable, if
the FOB applicant has been sued under section (1)(6) and the litigation is
still pending, or (ii) eighteen months have passed since the first FOB was
deemed interchangeable and the FOB applicant has not been sued under
(1)(6).1 ° This is not at all straightforward, so we return to the hypothetical
first introduced at the beginning of this article to illustrate the illusory
nature of this incentive. For these purposes, however, assume that Pferck's
ColorView (plutoniox) for the treatment of colorblindness is a biologic
rather than a drug.
Because its product is properly regulated under the PHSA rather
than the FDCA, Pferck submits to the FDA a BLA to market
ColorView (plutoniox) for the treatment of colorblindness. To
ensure it maintains market exclusivity to the fullest extent
possible, Pferck holds three issued patents covering plutoniox,
and it has two patent applications for methods of treating
colorblindness with plutoniox currently pending. Pferck obtains
FDA approval to market ColorView (plutoniox) on Tuesday,
January 4, 2011.
Under these circumstances, any party that wishes to file a subsection
(k) application to compete with ColorView for treating colorblindness must
wait until Monday, January 5, 2015 to so file." I Now assume that a company
called BioSame has developed a biologic called plutoniax, and this
company has gathered data sufficient to conclusively show that plutoniax
is interchangeable with plutoniox for the treatment of colorblindness in
accordance with all FDA-imposed standards. BioSame files its subsection
(k) application for plutoniax on the first day it is eligible to do so, January
5, 2015. The FDA accepts BioSame's subsection (k) application for filing,
deeming it complete and in accordance with all FDA-imposed standards
for filing, on Monday, February 2, 2015. Step 1 of the BPCIA pre-litigation
protocol, described supra, is complete. Twenty days later, on Monday,
February 23, 2015,12 Pferck receives notification from BioSame that it has
filed, and the FDA has accepted, a subsection (k) application for plutoniax.2 1 3
210 Id.
211 See § 262(k)(7)(B).
212 More accurately, this date is twenty-one days later. Twenty days after the deadline
is a Sunday. For purposes herein, we shall assume that if the deadline falls on a weekend, it is
extended to the next business day.
213 § 262(1)(2).
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BioSame also includes a copy of the subsection (k) application3'14 Step 2
has been satisfied.
For sake of simplicity, assume now that both parties comply strictly
with the good faith negotiations required by the BPCIA before Pferck
can file suit, and assume that neither party attempts any gamesmanship
during the negotiations (such as belatedly disclosing infringement or
invalidity contentions, belatedly and improperly identifying new patents
late in the negotiations, etc.). Pferck informs BioSame, sixty days later on
Friday, April 24, 2015, that its subsection (k) application infringes Pferck's
three patents, and Pferck informs BioSame that it is not willing to license
any of the three."' l Step 3 is complete. Sixty days thereafter, on Tuesday,
June 23, 2015, BioSame responds as it must with its non-infringement,
invalidity, and unenforceability positions. 2 16 Step 4 is complete. Sixty days
thereafter, on Monday, August 24, 2015, 21 Pferck provides BioSame with
its infringement positions as well as its counters to BioSame's invalidity
and unenforceability positions. 18 Step 5 is satisfied. ,
At this point under Step 6, the parties now have fifteen days, until
Tuesday, September 8, 2015, to agree on which patents should be subject
to immediate litigation. 19 Assume that they do not agree, and they move
to Step 7; Pferck wants to litigate all three immediately, whereas BioSame
wants to litigate only one. Therefore, on September 8, 2015, BioSame
informs Pferck to select "one" patent for immediate litigation. Within five
days, or specifically on Friday, September 11, 2015, Pferck and BioSame
exchange the identity of the single patent each has selected for litigation.2 '
The patents are different, so two patents are properly the subject of the
ensuing (1)(6) litigation."2 ' Pferck files suit against BioSame on those two
patents twenty-eight days later, on Friday, October 9, 2015, as required
under Step 8.
With these dates set, we now calculate the dates of the triggering events.
The BPCIA does not permit FDA approval of BioSame's plutoniax to be
any earlier than Wednesday, January 4, 2023, twelve years from the date
ColorView (plutoniox) became FDA-approved. Assume plutoniax receives
FDA approval on that date. Further assume that BioSame first commercially
launches plutoniax on that date-its earliest available opportunity. Under
these circumstances, the first triggering event is Thursday, January 4,
2024, the one-year anniversary of the first commercial marketing of the
214 § 262(l)(2)(A).
215 § 262()(3)(A).
z6 § 262(l)(3)(B).
217 This is actually sixty-two days. Sixty days falls on a Saturday. Seesupra note 212.
218 § 262(l)(3)(C).
219 § 262()(4).
220 § 262(l)(5)(B)(i).
221 § 262(l)(6)(B).
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FOB plutoniax.12 No subsequent FOB can be deemed interchangeable
any earlier unless one of the other two remaining triggering events occurs
earlier.
To calculate the date of the second triggering event, we would need to
know the date the litigation commenced in Step 8 concluded. The second
triggering event will occur eighteen months after either the entry of a final
court decision relating to the two patents asserted by Pferck, or a dismissal
with or without prejudice of that action. 3 Fortunately, we do not need to
calculate the exact date of the second triggering event to conclude that
the award of procedurally imperfect market exclusivity is in practice no
incentive at all.
For the exclusivity to have any value at all to an FOB applicant, that
applicant must have the opportunity to commercialize its product prior
to its expiration. The alternative would permit other interchangeable
FOBs to compete commercially with the first interchangeable FOB on the
first day the latter could be marketed. Thus, under our hypothetical, the
procedurally imperfect market exclusivity must not expire prior to January
4, 2023-the earliest opportunity BioSame would have to market its FOB.
To prevent the second triggering event from occurring prior to January 4,
2023, the litigation commenced in Step 8 must not end any earlier than
eighteen months prior to that date, July 4, 2021. Given that the litigation
in Step 8 began on October 9, 2015, the litigation will have to persist for
a period of almost seven years for the exclusivity period to have any value.
The average duration of any patent infringement suit lasts approximately
two years, including appeal.114 An FOB applicant therefore must hope
perversely to extend litigation for approximately four years to derive any
value from the BPCIA's procedurally imperfect market exclusivity.
Consider also that this calculation ignores completely the possibility
that an FOB applicant may be delayed in commercially launching its
product on the day it receives FDA approval for a variety of reasons. For
instance, in our hypothetical, the litigation of Step 8 involved only two of
Pferck's three issued patents. Pferck may assert the third patent, and either
or both of the previously pending patent applications if they ultimately
and timely issue, as part of a preliminary injunction suit within 180 days
of BioSame's intended commercial launch. In this circumstance, BioSame
must hope to extend the initial litigation for an even longer period, which
.222 § 262(k)(6)(A).
223 § 262(k)(6)(B).
224 Richard D. Margiano, Cost and Duration of Patent Liigation, MANAGING INTELL. PROP.
(Feb. I, 2oo9), http:// http://www.managingip.com/Article/zo894o5/Cost-and-duration-of-
patent-litigation.html.
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in turn would result in BioSame litigating two lawsuits simultaneously for
at least some period of time.
The triggering events, when considered in light of both the twelve-
year procedurally perfect market exclusivity awarded the innovative
biologic and the contemplated patent litigation framework of the BPCIA,
render the procedurally imperfect market exclusivity awarded to the first
interchangeable FOB entirely worthless."' 5
3. Unrealistic and Inefficient Litigation Framework.-The third and final
problem inherent in the BPCIA and raised for purposes of-this article has
to do with the nature of the litigation framework provided in the BPCIA.
Specifically, the fact that the BPCIA requires good faith negotiations for
months prior to the initiation of any patent litigation suit, and the fact
that two litigations are contemplated for every subsection (k) application
filed, make the prospects of filing a subsection (k) application perhaps too
daunting to consider. As alluded to earlier, the "good faith" negotiations
permit far too many opportunities for skilled litigators to participate in
gamesmanship. For instance, in considering which patents a reference
product sponsor should include in its initial (1)(3) list, the reference product
sponsor and its counsel should consider a variety of factors, including the
likelihood that a subsection (k) applicant will supplement any omission
of a relevant patent by including those in its own (1)(3) list (and thereby
eliminate the need to disclose infringement positions on these patents
prior to suit);"2 6 the likelihood of any pending patent applications issuing
as patents after exchange of (1)(3) lists (thereby ensuring the possibility
of a second litigation for the same predicate act of filing a subsection (k)
application); and the likelihood of the subsection (k) applicant disengaging
from pre-litigation negotiation at any stage. Similarly, the subsection (k)
applicant and its counsel should consider whether to engage in the pre-
litigation negotiations at all; whether it should participate only insofar as
225 Underlying this criticism is the question of what it means precisely when an FOB is
deemed to be "interchangeable" under the BPCIA, and whether being deemed interchange-
able amounts to being "approved" to commercially market an FOB. Assuming that a desig-
nation of interchangeability necessarily comes with approval to begin commercial market-
ing, the criticism provided in the text is sound. If a designation of "interchangeability" can
precede FDA approval to commercially market a product, then this serves only to cloud the
issue further. No prospective subsection (k) applicant could calculate with any certainty the
amount of "interchangeable" exclusivity it could expect, regardless of the outcome of any (1)
(6) litigation.
226 See § 262(l)(3).
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exchanging (1)(3) lists; or whether there is an optimal point further in the
negotiations at which it should disengage entirely."2 7
Additionally, with the costs associated with traditional patent litigations
of late,"2 8 filing a subsection (k) application with the knowledge that
potentially either of two lawsuits might prevent the commercial launch of
its proposed FOB may be prohibitive.
B. Proposed Solutions
1. The Easy Fixes.-Of the three practical problems noted above, two can be
resolved with very little effort. First, with respect to the illusory incentive
to be the first to receive an interchangeable determination, the grant of
twelve years of procedurally perfect market exclusivity period afforded
novel biologics should be replaced with an award of seven to nine years
of data exclusivity. Second, the unrealistic and inefficient patent litigation
framework of the BPCIA should be replaced with the predecessor model
provided for in Hatch-Waxman. These simple fixes would dramatically
improve the likelihood that the BPCIA will assist rather than hinder the
growth of a domestic biosimilars market.
Reduction of the twelve-year procedurally perfect market exclusivity
period to seven to nine years serves at least two purposes. It would
impart significance to the now-illusory procedurally imperfect market
exclusivity afforded a first interchangeable biologic. It would also render
the expectation that parties engage in the entirety of the BPCIA's pre-
litigation negotiation a bit more realistic. Subsection (k) applicants could
file their FDA applications expecting an immediate patent infringement
suit, they could engage in negotiations leading to suit with confidence, and
they would know when the suit is filed that their procedurally imperfect
market exclusivity will not expire before they had a chance to exploit it. The
incentive to avoid immediate litigation by defaulting in the pre-litigation
negotiations is eliminated, as is the need to extend any immediate patent
litigation for a period of seven to eleven years. This solution has the added
attraction of having been discussed previously in Congress, as a seven-year
exclusivity period was originally contemplated in at least one of the earlier
versions of the bill prior to enactment.2 9
Replacement of the procedurally perfect market exclusivity with
data exclusivity also serves two important objectives: it restores value to
227 Indeed, a strict reading of the exclusivity provisions afforded a first interchangeable
FOB might incentivize a party to avoid (1)(6) litigation altogether, instead subjecting itself to
a declaratory judgment action for failure to comply with pre-litigation negotiation obligations.
A final judgment from a declaratory judgment action under (1)(9) would not serve as a "trig-
ger" event like that from an (1)(6) litigation.
228 See Margiano, supra note 224.
229 Seesupra Part IV.A.2-3
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pharmaceutical patents pertaining to biologics, and it balances the need
to incentivize innovation with the need to secure the public's well-being.
Others have commented upon the fact that, in light of an award of perfect
market exclusivity for a new biologic, trade secrecy would replace patent
law as the preferred intellectually property protection mechanism in
the industry. 3 The conclusion makes perfect sense. With the average
pharmaceutical patent enjoying an effective term of 11.7 years,231 an award
of a twelve-year, completely impregnable, guaranteed market exclusivity
would eliminate any incentive at all to incur even the monetary cost of
obtaining a patent. When one also considers the cost incurred by the
obligation to disclose and enable the invention in order to obtain the patent,
thereby encouraging potential competitors to make and use the invention
upon the patent's expiry, patent protection would serve more harm than
good to any biologics innovator. The complexities of biologics render them
nearly impossible to reverse engineer, and an incredible expenditure in
resources would be required to do so in any event. The disclosure required
to obtain a patent is too high a price to pay in this context. Biologic
pharmaceutical patents have virtually no value under the current terms of
the BPCIA.
Data exclusivity, rather than procedurally perfect market exclusivity,
also serves the public's interest. Recall that prior to enactment of the
BPCIA, Congress awarded procedurally perfect market exclusivity for new
medicines only under the Orphan Drug Act. The ODA awarded such an
extreme and valuable incentive only because absent such a grant, the ODA
would likely never achieve its intended purpose-to stimulate research and
development for the treatment and/or cure of rare conditions or diseases.
Without the grant, pharmaceutical companies would have no sound
business justification to expend resources to treat rare diseases. The low
demand for the drug, coupled with the costs for research and development
of that drug, would require innovator companies to set prices prohibitively
high in order to recoup costs before generic entry in the market. The ODA
alleviated that concern by guaranteeing market exclusivity for seven years,
independent of any patent rights that may or may not be held.
The same concerns are not at issue for biologics. Prior to the BPCIA,
biologics had already become a significant part of the pharmaceutical
market. Normal market demands have produced expected business
responses without need for legislativd intervention. The BPCIA
admittedly introduces a more efficient means through which competition
is introduced into a given biologics market, so some incentive to the
innovator is appropriate to offset that effect. But an award that permits the
innovator to set prices without fear of competition for over a decade over-
230 See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 3 1, at I 1I.
231 See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19
INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 116 (2000).
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compensates the innovator at the expense of the public. The potential for
innovator abuse is tremendous. Data exclusivity at least provides the public
with security in that if the innovator sets prices too exorbitantly, potential
competitors will enter the market sooner. So long as the cost to conduct
their own clinical trials is less than the profit they might expect to gain
by earlier entry into the market, potential competitors will circumvent the
data exclusivity to enter the market. Innovators are then free to set prices
for their biologics with restraint: set them high enough to recoup costs over
a period of time, but not so high as to attract premature competition. This
seems a more balanced approach than that currently found in the BPCIA.
Replacing the twelve-year procedurally perfect market exclusivity with
a seven to nine year data exclusivity period would also lead to facilitating
the implementation of the litigation framework contemplated under
Hatch-Waxman, a framework far more practicable than that proposed
under the BPCIA. While use of the Orange Book and related litigation
under the Hatch-Waxman regime has been far from flawless, it is at least
honest. Hatch-Waxman does not contemplate the parties to an ANDA
litigation to be anything other than what they are-adversaries. The NDA
holder wants to keep any competitors off the market for as long as they can;
the ANDA applicants want to be the first to market a generic competitor to
that reference product as soon as possible. The interests of each party are
in direct conflict with those of the other. This is no less so in the biologics
market, yet the BPCIA naively expects opposing parties to cooperate in
negotiations prior to the inevitable patent litigation. The BPCIA provides
a framework of cooperative game theory for players who are by definition
non-cooperative. 3 This is destined to fail. At best, the BPCIA as it
stands will require years of litigation and volumes of case law to sort those
behaviors in pre-litigation negotiations that are acceptable from those that
are punishable, and to define the extent that unacceptable practices should
be punished. By mirroring the provisions of Hatch-Waxman, at least with
respect to listing patents in the Orange Book and requiring subsection (k)
applicants to certify as to patent rights as part of their applications, the
parties and the courts could benefit from the wisdom accumulated during
the years of litigation that have occurred since passage of the Hatch-
Waxman Act.
Moreover, returning to the use of data exclusivities, the Orange Book, and
the requirement for patent certifications as part of subsection (k) applications
will restore value to biologic pharmaceutical patents. By awarding less than
an impregnable hold on a given market by way of regulatory forbearance,
the Act necessarily promotes the significance of patent rights to maintain
market exclusivity. This in turn promotes continued innovation in the
industry as a whole. Instead of permitting an innovator to hoard profits
232 Giacomo Bonanno, Non-Cooperative Game Theory 2-3 (Univ. Cal. Davis, Working Pa-
per No. 86, 2oo8), available at http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working-papers/o8-6.pdf.
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for an incremental advancement in biomedicine, it permits an innovator to
reap reward for its achievement while encouraging future innovation. Just
as patents have stimulated innovation in all industries, they could do so in
the biologic pharmaceutical industry.
2. The Tough Fix.-There seems to be no simple solution for determining
how the FDA should distinguish between "interchangeables" and
"biosimilars," which is arguably the most problematic of the three flaws
addressed above. The problem is inherent in the nature of biologics-
they are exponentially more complex and more expensive than their small
molecule counterparts. As such, the need for a streamlined approach to
approve FOBs is simultaneously much greater and much more difficult to
implement.
Four high-level FDA officials co-authored a paper recently published
in the New England Journal of Medicine acknowledging the difficulties
that await the FDA in evaluating FOBs. 33 Specifically, the authors
concede that "[g]iven the complex nature of biologics, it's unlikely that
a 'one size fits all' systematic assessment" of FOBs could be used even to
determine the biosimilarity vel non of a particular FOB when compared
to a reference product.134 They therefore advocate a "totality-of-the-
evidence" approach to evaluate proposed biosimilars, and they expect
that each FOB will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis similar to the
method employed in Europe. 35 This proposed solution only underscores
the dysfunction inherent in the BPCIA. The case-by-case assessment
protocol lacks the certainty a potential subsection (k) applicant would
require prior to submission of its application. Without knowledge of the
costs involved in obtaining even a biosimilarity determination, let alone
an interchangeability determination, the potential subsection (k) applicant
would be better served in filing an original BLA. Pursuing a BLA would
at least give the applicant cost certainty related to the application, and the
known reward for obtaining BLA approval would serve to defray any extra
expense occurred in opting for the more costly route. Filing an abbreviated
application in this instance simply makes no economic sense, particularly
when the availability of a reward in the form of a procedurally imperfect
market exclusivity would remain unknown during the pendency of the
FOB's evaluation.
Perhaps an alternative solution might be to eliminate the distinction
between biosimilarity and interchangeability at the legislative level and
simply award regulatory exclusivities for the first-filed or first-approved
FOB. Interchangeability in the biologics context-where a pharmacist
233 See Kozlowski et al., supra note 2oo, at 385.
234 Id. at 387.
235 Id.
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can substitute one biologic for another without doctor approval2 36-seems
unrealistic to achieve in any event. Moreover, this would be consistent
with the award of regulatory exclusivities in the generic drug context.
Hatch-Waxman makes no legislative distinction between Therapeutic
and Pharmaceutical Equivalents; 37 the BPCIA should refrain from doing
so in the biologics context. Potential subsection (k) applicants also would
benefit to know at or around the time they filed their applications whether
procedurally imperfect market exclusivity was available. While this solution
has at least superficial appeal, however, detractors will readily point out
that this does little to remedy the uncertainty a subsection (k) applicant
would have with respect to the application's cost. This proposed solution
fixes only the uncertainty regarding the potential award awaiting an FOB
applicant. Until something more than a case-by-case, totality-of-the-
evidence approach is contemplated for evaluating FOBs,.the uncertainty
surrounding the investment required for an FOB application may well
prove sufficient to deter potential applicants from using the BPCIA's
abbreviated pathway to obtain FDA approval for any FOBs.
V. LEGISLATIVE PRUDENCE
A. The BPCIA and Legislative Imprudence
A study of the terms of the BPCIA and its impending consequences
reveals the presence of certain idiosyncrasies within the Act itself, all of
which reveal a certain imprudence in ultimately ratifying the Act. For
example, consider that the Act-contains both a data exclusivity provision
and procedurally perfect market exclusivity provision. As stated earlier, the
former exclusivity is entirely superfluous to the reference product sponsor
in light of the latter. Query then why the BPCIA's data exclusivity provision
exists. Within Hatch-Waxman, the data exclusivity provision serves as a
gatekeeper for any applicant willing to challenge a relevant Orange Book-
listed patent as part of its abbreviated application. Such a challenge cannot
be submitted to the FDA prior to the expiration of the data exclusivity
period. The provision also serves as an implicit reminder that an applicant
is free to file an abbreviated "paper NDA" to obtain approval for a product;
the applicant simply cannot rely on the data submitted by the reference
product sponsor. The BPCIA, however, has no corresponding role for
the data exclusivity provision. There is no "paper NDA' version of an
abbreviated biologic application in the BPCIA. Patent challenges do not
comprise any part of a subsection (k) application. Perhaps the BPCIA's data
exclusivity provision serves to minimize the responsibility of the FDA for
236 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(6) (West 2oi I).
237 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2oo6).
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storing early-filed applications for later review, but one would think that
Congress had some other reason to include that provision. What, then, is
that purpose?
The entirety of the pre-litigation negotiations required by the BPCIA
is another idiosyncrasy of the Act. The process outlined by the BPCIA is
unlike anything previously promulgated by Congress, and it reads more
like a district court's local rules for "meet and confer" requirements than it
does federal legislation.
A third example can be found in the BPCIA's express delineation
of a distinction between a "biosimilar" biologic product and an
"interchangeable" one. If one exists, currently the FDA is asking where it
can be found.
A fourth is the litany of conflicting or irreconcilable terms within the Act
itself. The twelve-year procedurally perfect exclusivity period, in addition
to rendering pointless the data exclusivity period, also eviscerates the
value of the procedurally imperfect market exclusivity awarded to the first
interchangeable FOB. The triggering events of the procedurally imperfect
market exclusivity period perversely motivate subsection (k) applicants to
either extend litigation for prolonged periods or default during the BPCIA's
required pre-litigation negotiations so to avoid a premature triggering
event.
The author respectfully submits that these examples are indicative
of Congressional failure to practice legislative prudence in ratifying the
BPCIA.
B. Defining Legislative Prudence
Legislative prudence was first introduced as a concept in Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics. There, it was identified and discretely distinguished
from more general notions of prudence, and it was defined as the
"controlling part" of "the wisdom concerned with the city." '38 Additional
details were wanting. Instead, a brief taxonomic classification of prudence
followed. Prudence was defined generally as the virtue of practical wisdom
"concerned with things just and noble and good for man"; "political"
238 INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 470 (Richard McKeon ed., 2d ed. 1973). Note that the
term prudence is not found in the cited text; rather, the term "practical wisdom" or "wisdom"
is employed. Centuries earlier, however, Aquinas had understood these passages of Aristotle's
to refer to the concept of "prudence" rather than "wisdom." See infra notes 237-39 and ac-
companying text. For this reason, credit is given to Aristotle for first introducing the notion of
"legislative prudence."
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prudence was not to be confused with "legislative" prudence; and the
former was concerned with the "particulars" comprising latter 39
Aquinas later provided some clarification concerning Aristotelian ideas
of legislative prudence in his Summa Theologiae, but that clarification was
minimal.14° He did take issue with Aristotelian classifications of legislative
and political prudence, positing instead, "Prudence is in the reason ... [a]
nd so the more each shares in the responsibilities of ruling and governing
so much the more he possesses in the quality of being reasonable and
prudent." '' By definition, then, it seemed that Aquinas viewed legislative
prudence simply as prudence exercised by lawmakers in performing
legislative functions. 4 After subsequently reasoning that kingly prudence
was "of a special and most complete kind," however, he declared that
"the ruling [lawmaking] prudence of a polity is set down as a kind of
prudence. ' ' 143 No further details were provided.
Little else readily appears to have been written on the subject until
recently, when Hittinger,2" later elaborated upon by Strang, 4 reintroduced
Aristotelian distinctions: "[Legislative prudence], possessed by legislators,
is 'the capacity to make and impose laws.' [It] allows the legislator to issue
laws that order society toward the common good. Political prudence, by
contrast, is the virtue of directing oneself in accord with the commands of
superiors.""'6
For purposes of this article, no definition from this brief etymologic
survey will do. While each provides an arguably sufficient conceptual
description of legislative prudence, none provide a standard by which one
can measure whether legislative prudence was exercised by a legislating
body at the time of a law's ratification. Aquinas's definition is limited to
whether individual lawmakers exercised prudence individually. Hittinger's
is similarly limited, and it is a tautology-legislators by definition have
the capacity to make and impose laws; they therefore demonstrate
legislative prudence each time they propose and approve new law. Strang's
definition also is limited to evaluating the prudence of an individual
lawmaker, though arguably the concept could be extended with integrity
239 INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE, supra note 238, at 476.
240 36 ST ThOMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA ThEOLOGIAE: PRUDENCE 39 (Thomas Gilby ed.,
1974)-
241 Id.
242 See id. at 87 (eliminating distinctions between political prudence and general pru-
dence).
243 Id. at 85.
244 RUSSELL HITTINGERITIE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A POST-
CHRISTIAN WORLD (2003).
245 Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions within Con-
stitutional Interpretation: Originalism Grounded in the Central Western Philosophical Tradition, z8
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 909 (2005).
246 Id. at 919 (quoting HIXTINGER,supra note 244).
[Vol. I00
BPCIA: IMPRUDENCE & DEVALUATION
to encompass whether a legislative body issued laws for the common good.
The shortcoming with this definition, as well as Aristotle's, however, is that
it is result-oriented and therefore temporally imprecise. At the very least,
it begs the question of when a particular piece of legislation has achieved a
common good.
A process-oriented definition of legislative prudence is required. A
return to first principles suggests that prudence is learned from experience
and deliberation.147 Logically it follows that prudence is exercised when
actions are made based on experience and deliberation. Legislative
experience therefore is exercised when a legislature makes and imposes
laws based on experience and deliberation. An examination of the terms of
the BPCIA reveals that the Act was not ratified on those bases.
C. Applying Legislative Prudence
The notion that the BPCIA was not deliberated prior to its enactment,
nor drafted based on experience, may seem far-fetched. After all, various
versions of the legislation had been circulated and debated in Congress
for nearly three years prior to its enactment,2 48 and as discussed, supra,
Hatch-Waxman served as the template for at least portions of the Act. True
experience, though, means more than borrowing from previous legislation.
And deliberation requires more than debate. More accurately, prudential
deliberation is a type of inquiry that requires the employment of reason
in the proper way at the proper time to achieve a commendable end.
49
Establishment of an abbreviated approval pathway for FOBs is certainly
a commendable end. But the flaws of the BPCIA call into question
whether the Act was deliberated in the proper way, at the proper time, with
experience guiding the discussions.
For example, the apparently superfluous data exclusivity provision of the
BPCIA can only be a remnant of the Hatch-Waxman Act itself, indicating
that Congress leaned heavily on the Act as a template to fashion legislation
of similar kind. The practice itself is not to be admonished, as it is a function
of experience. When consequences of certain borrowed provisions are
misunderstood or overlooked, however, Congress acts imprudently. Proper
deliberation is rightness in thinking."' 0 Misunderstanding or overlooking
provisions from a predecessor act and incorporating them into new
legislation simply is contrary to that principle. So, too, is misunderstanding
or overlooking the effect that one provision of new legislation may have on
another, as with the twelve-year procedurally perfect market exclusivity
period that renders illusory other necessary incentives within the 'BPCIA.
247 See INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE, supra note 238, at 474.
248 See Carver et al., supra note i4, at 7 16-17.
249 See INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE, supra note 238, at 472-74.
250 See id. at 473.
2011-20121
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Proper deliberation would have identified such an effect. The decision to
include the regulatory market exclusivities that exist in the current BPCIA
was not reached through the exercise of experience and proper deliberation
The same can be said for provisions of the BPCIA that are more properly
within the province of. other government branches. With respect to the
required pre-litigation good-faith negotiations, for instance, no government
entity is better suited than our federal courts to anticipate and govern
the actions of potential litigants of a pharmaceutical patent infringement
action. If Congress wanted to impose certain standards of pre-litigation
conduct upon potential litigants, it at least should have enlisted the courts'
assistance. Courts already impose pre-litigation obligations on future
litigants through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Through similar
means, courts could impose obligations sufficient to achieve the purpose
of identifying patents for litigation while at the same time honoring its
jurisdictional limitations. Further, courts could fashion pre-litigation
obligations to minimize opportunities for legal maneuvering. Congressional
failure to enlist the courts' assistance in crafting these provisions is another
example of imprudent deliberation.
Congress also exceeded its prudential limits by legislating into existence
the "interchangeable biologic," distinguishing the interchangeable biologic
from a biosimilar, and then formulating an abbreviated FOB approval
pathway based in part on that distinction. Recall that the Hatch-Waxman
Act contains no corresponding language."5 ' Hatch-Waxman provides only
that an FDA applicant may submit either a "paper NDX' or an ANDA
to expedite approval of a follow-on drug."'2 Hatch-Waxman makes no
qualitative distinction between follow-on drugs, nor does it award any
incentives based on such a qualitative distinction. Hatch-Waxman simply
awards an incentive to the first ANDA applicant who files a patent challenge
as part of the application." 3 It is the FDA, the government agency with
sufficient expertise in the relevant field, which first recognized and then
promulgated the distinction between Pharmaceutical Equivalents and
Therapeutic Equivalents.'-'
Congress disregarded, or at least mistook, the experience gained
from enacting and imposing Hatch-Waxman to assume that qualitative,
measurable differences between FOBs exist simply because they exist
between follow-on drugs. This assumption now appears premature. As a
result, the FDA continues to solicit comments as to how best to implement
an Act that is predicated upon premature suppositions. Until the FDA can
provide guidance to future subsection (k) applicants as to what data will be
required to differentiate a biosimilar from an interchangeable, and unless
251 See supra Part I.C.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 See supra Part III.A.
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that data will be less costly to accumulate than the data needed for a BLA
application, the BPCIA will serve no purpose. Together, the timing and
terms of BPCIA indicate that imprudent deliberation led to its ratification.
In formulating the current terms of the BPCIA, Congress admittedly
experienced inordinate pressures to propose an abbreviated FOB approval
pathway at its earliest opportunity. Currently commercially available
biologic therapies were too expensive for many patients to afford and costs
for such therapies were projected to soar even higher; few will contest that
legislative intervention was necessary."' 5 In addition, passage of the Act was
projected to facilitate a new, robust biosimilar pharmaceutical industry, and
many were eager to participate in the market. Under these circumstances,
a less than perfect BPCIA is arguably understandable. Less so, however,
is the apparent failure of Congress to employ legislative prudence while
enacting this legislation.
D. Deducing Characteristics of Legislative Prudence
The flaws of the BPCIA indicate that Congress acted too hastily in
response to growing demands and pressure for an abbreviated regulatory
approval pathway for FOBs. Specifically, it failed to deliberate properly
prior to the Act's proposal and enactment in order to identify inconsistent or
superfluous provisions. It legislated beyond its technological understanding
when it created the "interchangeable biologic." It ignored the benefits of
experience in abandoning the litigation framework under Hatch-Waxman
and creating a new regime without consultation of the courts. Despite
these examples, though, the contours of exactly what constitutes legislative
prudence remain nebulous. At least an analysis of the BPCIA informs the
issue.
First, we now know that legislative prudence is not exercised when
legislation contains irreconcilable provisions within the same act. The
result is violative of proper deliberation. Second, legislative prudence
requires an understanding of the limitations of the legislative body itself,
particularly with respect to its knowledge of the governed activities, its
familiarity with the governed actors, and its appreciation of the resources
needed and costs necessary to implement the legislation. Understanding
legislative limitations is something achieved over time with legislative
experience. Third, legislative prudence requires the ability to withstand
extra-legislative pressures. This is a combination of relying on lessons
255 See Hearings, supra note 14, at 34 (Nov. 3, 2010 testimony of Dr. James Roach); see
also id. at 77 (Nov. 3, 2010 testimony of Dr. Anshuman Patwardhan) (concluding the BPCIA
will "cause a reduction in monopoly pricing of biologics and a break to the runaway cost of
health").
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learned from experience and understanding the proper time and manner
for deliberation and action.
Additional components of legislative prudence surely exist; these
characteristics are not submitted as an exhaustive list. Analyses of past
failed acts and the circumstances under which they were enacted may
reveal more. Perhaps upon reading this article others may be motivated to
engage in such study. For now, however, the shortcomings of the BPCIA
suggest at least three characteristics of legislative prudence that should be
minded in future legislative endeavors. Heeding as much will lessen the
likelihood that future legislation might paradoxically undermine the very
objective for which it was enacted.
